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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with three questions: first, how can the effects macroe-
conomic policy has on the economy in general be estimated? Second, what are the
effects of a pre-announced increase in government expenditures? Third, how should
monetary policy be conducted, if the policymaker faces uncertainty about the economic
environment.
In the first chapter I suggest to estimate the effects of an exogenous disturbance
on the economy by considering the parameter distributions of a Vector Autoregression
(VAR) model and a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model jointly.
This allows to resolve the major issue a researcher has to deal with when working
with a VAR model and a DSGE model: the identification of the VAR model and the
potential misspecification of the DSGE model.
The second chapter applies the methodology presented in the preceding chapter to
investigate the effects of a pre-announced change in government expenditure on private
consumption and real wages. The shock is identified by exploiting its pre-announced
nature, i.e. different signs of the responses in endogenous variables during the an-
nouncement and after the realization of the shock. Private consumption is found to
respond negatively during the announcement period and positively after the realiza-
tion. The reaction of real wages is positive on impact and positive for two quarters
after the realization.
In the last chapter ’Optimal Policy Under Model Uncertainty: A Structural-
Bayesian Estimation Approach’ I investigate jointly with Christian Stoltenberg how
policy should optimally be conducted when the policymaker is faced with uncertainty
about the economic environment. The standard procedure is to specify a prior over the
parameter space ignoring the status of some sub-models. We propose a procedure that
ensures that the specified set of sub-models is not discarded too easily. We find that
optimal policy based on our procedure leads to welfare gains compared to the standard
practice.
Keywords:
Bayesian Model Estimation, Vector Autoregression, Identification, Government
expenditure shock, Optimal monetary policy, Model Uncertainty, Non-invertibility

Zusammenfassung
Diese Doktorarbeit untersucht drei Fragestellungen. Erstens, wie die Wirkung von
plötzlichen Änderungen exogener Faktoren auf endogene Variablen empirisch im Allge-
meinen zu bestimmen ist. Zweitens, welche Effekte eine Erhöhung der Staatsausgaben
im Speziellen hat. Drittens, wie optimale Geldpolitik bestimmt werden kann, wenn der
Entscheider keine eindeutigen Modelle für die ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen hat.
Im ersten Kapitel entwickele ich eine Methode, mithilfe derer die Effekte von plötz-
lichen Änderungen exogener Faktoren auf endogene Variablen geschätzt werden kön-
nen. Dazu wird die gemeinsame Verteilung von Parametern einer Vektor Autoregres-
sion (VAR) und eines stochastischen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodelles (DSGE) be-
stimmt. Auf diese Weise können zentrale Probleme gelöst werden: das Identifikations-
problem der VAR und eine mögliche Misspezifikation des DSGE Modells.
Im zweitem Kapitel wende ich die Methode aus dem ersten Kapitel an, um den
Effekt einer angekündigten Erhöhung der Staatsausgaben auf den privaten Konsum
und die Reallöhne zu untersuchen. Die Identifikation beruht auf der Einsicht, dass
endogene Variablen, oft qualitative Unterschiede in der Periode der Ankündigung und
nach der Realisation zeigen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der private Konsum negativ
im Zeitraum der Ankündigung reagiert und positiv nach der Realisation. Reallöhne
steigen zum Zeitpunkt der Ankündigung und sind positiv für zwei Perioden nach der
Realisation.
Im abschließendem Kapitel untersuche ich gemeinsam mit Christian Stoltenberg,
wie Geldpolitik gesteuert werden sollte, wenn die Modellierung der Ökonomie unsicher
ist. Wenn ein Modell um einen Parameter erweitert wird, kann das Modell dadurch
so verändert werden, dass sich die Politikempfehlungen zwischen dem ursprünglichen
und dem neuen Modell unterscheiden. Oft wird aber lediglich das erweiterte Modell
betrachtet. Wir schlagen eine Methode vor, die beiden Modellen Rechnung trägt und
somit zu einer besseren Politik führt.
Schlagwörter:
Bayesianische Modellschätzung, Vektor Autoregression, Identifizierung,
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1.1 Scope of the study
Macroeconomic policy is one of the most important determinants for the well being
of a society. Recent examples show how good macroeconomic policy can improve
the overall economic conditions: Norway raised the living standard of its inhabitants
by carefully managing the wealth after the exploration of vast oil reserves instead of
spending it right away. In Western Germany after World War II, the introduction
of a stable currency combined with market reforms substantially helped to boost the
economy. On the other hand, bad macroeconomic policy can have severe consequences
for the well being and stability of a society as the crisis in Argentine showed in the late
1990s. When the Argentine government spent a large amount of the foreign reserves,
the resulting devaluation of the Argentine peso and the lock of many savings accounts
led to sharp increase of people living in poverty.
Given the impact macroeconomic policy has on the development of today’s societies,
it is the primary task of macroeconomists to equip policy makers with good advise.
It is therefore important to understand the effects of macroeconomic policy and to
determine how it should be set optimally. This thesis aims at contributing to these
issues and improve the understanding of three areas in macroeconomics: first how the
effects of policy innovations can be estimated, second what the effects of an innovation
in government spending are and third how monetary policy should be conducted if the
policy maker faces uncertainty about the economic environment.
Knowing the precise effects of a policy instrument is of high value for the policy
maker. Unfortunately, the estimation of econometric time series models, the vehicle
best suited to examine these effects, exhibits a fundamental challenge: Vector Autore-
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gression (VAR) models can only be estimated in a reduced form, where the error terms
are correlated and their effects cannot be interpreted in an economically reasonable way.
This is only possible in a structural model. However, an estimated reduced form model
cannot be uniquely transferred into a corresponding structural model without impos-
ing additional assumptions. The second chapter of the thesis proposes a methodology
to identify the structural model by deriving additional restrictions from a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
These restrictions are determined as follows: After an innovation the impulse re-
sponse functions of the DSGE model are computed and the sign for some variables (but
not for the variable of interest) are imposed onto the VAR model, i.e. the structural
shock of the VAR model has to satisfy those restrictions. One obstacle is that different
parameterizations of a DSGE model yield different sign restrictions. I therefore aim
at finding the parameter values fitting the data best. Since the exercise is concerned
with the estimation of dynamic effects, the parameter values of the DSGE model are
estimated by matching the impulse response functions of the VAR model.
The third chapter puts the methodology at work: I analyze an innovation in gov-
ernment expenditures. The effect of a government expenditure shock is not only inten-
sively debated among politicians each time the economy is confronted with a recession,
it also divides macroeconomists on the question whether private consumption and the
real wage rise or fall after an increase in government expenditures. In the former case
an expansive fiscal policy would support the economic development and would thus be
a good policy prescription, in the latter it would not.
Findings in empirical work differ depending on the empirical strategy. I advocate to
estimate the effects of a government expenditure shock by taking one crucial aspect of
its nature into account: Changes in government expenditures are often pre-announced.
Certain variables then might react qualitatively different during the pre-announcement
period and after the realization. I employ a DSGE model which is rich enough to
account for different effects of an innovation in government expenditures and derive
sign restrictions from it to identify the VAR model. The innovation is assumed to
be announced two quarters in advance. The results indicate that a positive shock to
government expenditures leads to an increase in private consumption and real wages.
The fourth chapter (written jointly with Christian Stoltenberg) does not deal with
the effects policy has, but with the question how policy should be conducted optimally
if the policy maker is uncertain about the true economic environment. We take the
perspective of the central bank and aim at finding a policy rule, i.e. a rule that
determines the interest rate depending on inflation and the difference between the
Introduction 3
actual and the natural rate of output. This rule is optimal if it maximizes welfare
of the economy, that is the households’ utility. We define two sources of uncertainty:
uncertainty about the parameters of the model and uncertainty about the specification
of the model. Each combination of parameters and each specification of the model has
certain probabilities. We estimate the probabilities and compute a policy rule which
maximizes welfare across the specifications weighted by the corresponding probabilities.
We find that a policy maker with a concern for robustness should not simply include
all possible features into one model and use this exclusively to find the optimal policy
rule. An optimal policy rule derived from this model does no guard against model
uncertainty. It still performs poorly across a set of models including smaller versions
of it. The policy implications derived from these smaller versions of the model can
differ substantially from the implications of the larger model. We show that this needs
to be taken this into account by computing a rule optimal across the model space
instead of optimal in the largest model. While we stress that specification uncertainty
is important to consider, we also find that parameter uncertainty does not have serious
consequences: A policy rule determined at the mean of the parameter distribution
performs as well as a rule capturing the uncertainty.
To the three topics of this thesis, the estimation of the dynamic effects of innovations
in general, the special case of the effects of an innovation in government expenditures
and the optimal conduct of monetary policy under model uncertainty, several contribu-
tions have already been made. In the following section I will provide a brief overview
over the existing literature and juxtapose my work to it.
1.2 Literature review
In this section I am going to review first the literature on the identification of structural
VAR models, the estimation of DSGE models and frameworks aiming at the estimation
of both jointly in general. Afterwards I will survey existing work on the specific case
of the effect of an innovation in government expenditures. Finally, the literature on
optimal monetary policy under model uncertainty is presented.
1.2.1 Identification of a structural VAR model
When Sims (1980) introduced VAR models as a tool into macroeconomics he rec-
ommended to identify an estimated reduced form VAR model under a recursiveness
assumption that imposes a certain order to the variables of the model. This assump-
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tion induces that variables ordered first do not respond immediately to innovations
in variables ordered later. It is therefore an assumption concerning the timing of the
responses. This procedure results in a sufficient number of additional zero restric-
tions to identify the VAR model. This approach is widespread and used for example
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) to identify an innovation in monetary
policy.
A related identification scheme called contemporaneous restriction was introduced
by Sims and Zha (2006). The authors extend the concept of a recursive ordering.
The restrictions can be chosen more freely by determining which variables respond
contemporaneously to an innovation in another variable and which variables are pre-
determined.
Blanchard and Quah (1989) suggest to identify a VAR model by distinguishing
transitory shocks, i.e. shocks which have no permanent effects on the variables of the
VAR, and permanent ones. Since the behavior of the variables is restricted in the long
run, this kind of identification is called long run restriction. It is applied for example
when studying the effects of a technology shock, arguing that a technology shock is
the only shock which has a permanent impact (Francis and Ramey (2005) and Galí
(1999)).
In contrast to the identification of a shock by his long run properties Uhlig (2005a),
Faust (1998), Dwyer (1998), Canova and Nicolo (2002) and Canova and Pina (1999)
suggested to investigate the effects of an innovation by restricting the impulse response
functions of the variables directly. Canova and Nicolo (2002) and Canova and Pina
(1999) identify a monetary policy shock by restricting the sign of cross correlations,
Dwyer (1998) the shape of the response of some variables, and Uhlig (2005a) and Faust
(1998) the sign of the response. While Faust (1998) only consider the first period,
Uhlig (2005a) restricts the signs of the responses for a longer horizon. In those studies
only one innovation is analyzed. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) apply the concept to a
combination of shocks. Kociecki (2005) provides a general framework to formulate a
distribution over impulse response functions and thus formulate beliefs over their sign
and shape.
While the structural VAR model literature employs no information about the date
of innovations in monetary and fiscal policy, Romer and Romer (1990) suggest to study
the history of decisions of the central bank, i.e. the precise historic record, and use those
to study the effects of policy innovations. It is also employed in studies concerning fiscal
policy (Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999)).
All these identification schemes depend on the availability of some common a priori
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knowledge. In chapter 2 I suggest to consider a DSGE model as the source of this
common a priori knowledge and to derive restrictions from it. Since the restrictions
depend on the parametrization of the DSGE model, I now review the literature on how
to choose the parameters of the model.
1.2.2 Estimation of DSGE models
When Kydland and Prescott (1982) suggested to base macroeconomic analysis on
DSGE models they argued that the DSGE model represents only a small fraction
of the economy and is not meant to be estimated - in contrast to the large scale models
applied in those days. Instead they suggest to calibrate the DSGE model by choosing
reasonable values for its parameters found either in microeconomic studies or by fit-
ting the steady state of the DSGE model to long run characteristics in the data. In
succeeding papers (Kydland and Prescott (1991) and Kydland (1992)) give a detailed
illustration of how the parameter values should be determined.
Their approach came under attack by Hansen and Heckman (1996). They point
out that values found in microeconomic studies should not be used for two reasons:
either the existing microeconomic studies are to sparse or there exists a wide range
of estimates, which leads to a selection bias and therefore to inconsistencies between
studies employing a DSGE model as a tool. As a response to the criticism and in order
to be able to quantify the uncertainty about the parameter choice, consequent studies
estimated the parameters within the DSGE model framework. Thereby two strands of
the literature emerged, which differ considerably in their econometric interpretation of
the DSGE model. One strand interprets the DSGE model in the spirit of Kydland and
Prescott and seeks to match some selected moments as closely as possible. The other
strand considers the DSGE model as a full characterization of the observed time series.
In the following paragraphs I am going to review both strands more specifically.
Early attempts to estimate DSGE models were made by Lee and Ingram (1991),
Canova (1994), Canova (1995) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). The former au-
thors estimated the parameters of the DSGE model by simulated methods of moments
(SMM), the latter by generalized methods of moments (GMM). Both approaches build
on the original idea by Kydland and Prescott that parameters of the DSGE model
can be found by matching moment characteristics in the data. The parameters of
the DSGE model are found by minimizing the distance between the moments implied
by the DSGE model and those of the data, an estimation procedure introduced in a
different context by Hansen (1982).
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The idea of matching certain moments of the data was further used in the studies of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2007) and Mertens and Ravn (2008). The authors aim at
estimating the parameters of the DSGE model by minimizing the distance between
the implied impulse response function of the DSGE model and the impulse response
of the VAR model. Applying this estimation strategy, one issue becomes crucial: the
identification of the impulse response functions of the VAR model.
While those estimation procedures rely on weak assumptions concerning the ability
of the DSGE model to be a representation of the data generating process, other ap-
proaches aimed at employing a DSGE model as a full characterization of the observed
time series and not only of some moments. This assumption allows to estimate the
DSGE model by maximum likelihood. One of the main obstacles to this estimation
strategy is that the DSGE model typically is not fully stochastically specified, since
the number of structural shocks is smaller than the number of observed variables to
be explained. Following Sargent (1989), numerous authors (McGrattan (1994), Hall
(1996), Altug (1989), McGrattan, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) and Ireland (2004))
therefore add error terms to the structural equations of the DSGE model. Those error
terms, called measurement error terms, exhibit the difficulty that they are hard to
interpret economically.
Other studies abstained from including measurement errors and fitted the DSGE
model to a small number of time series (DeJong, Ingram, and Whiteman (2000), Kim
(2000) and Ireland (2001)). Smets and Wouters (2003) extend a DSGE model with sev-
eral structural shocks and additional nominal frictions and features in order to confront
the DSGE model with seven key macroeconomic time series. Additionally, building
upon DeJong et al. (2000), they employ a Bayesian approach, i.e. they combine a prior
distribution for the structural parameters with the likelihood and approximate the
posterior distribution. Their paper, together with the availability of "straightforward-
to-use" computer programs (Dynare) and of the computational power needed to use
these programs, paved the way for the estimation of DSGE models using this Bayesian
DSGE model estimation methodology.
In this thesis I comply with the weak econometric interpretation of the DSGE
model and estimate the parameters of the DSGE model by matching the corresponding
impulse response functions of the VAR model. At the same time, the VAR model is
estimated using restrictions from the DSGE model, i.e. both models are considered
jointly. The next section reviews the related literature.
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1.2.3 The DSGE model and the VARmodel considered jointly
Doan, Litterman, and Sims (1984) showed that the ability to forecast from a VAR
model can be improved by postulating a prior distribution for the parameters. In their
work they suggested a random walk. Ingram and Whiteman (1994) advanced this idea
by advocating that the prior distribution of the parameters should not be centered at a
random walk, but at moments (dummy observations) computed from a DSGE model.
DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004) build on this approach. They provide additional
insight on how the posterior distribution of the parameters of VAR model can be used
to infer on the parameters of the DSGE model.
Furthermore, they identify the VAR model using information from the DSGE
model.1 They employ the rotation matrix of the DSGE model to identify the VAR
model. To do so, the DSGE model has to be fully stochastically specified. Further-
more, while one can control for the prior weight of the dummy observations, one cannot
control for the prior weight of the implied dynamics of the DSGE. Sims (2006b) ex-
tends the idea to augment the VAR model with dummy observations in a more general
framework. In his approach, the tightness of the prior can be varied across frequencies
and the number of structural shocks does not need to equal the number of observations.
The methodology proposed in this thesis differs from DelNegro and Schorfheide
(2004) and Altig et al. (2002) by not using the implied rotation matrix of the DSGE
model to identify the VAR model and therefore not requiring the DSGE model to be
fully stochastically specified. In contrast to Sims (2006b), I employ the implied sign
and shape restrictions (as described in Uhlig (2005a)).
While the preceding sections were concerned with VAR models and how to iden-
tify their structural form, the following section will deal with the application of this
methodology and its results for a specific innovation: An innovation in government
expenditures.
1.2.4 Government expenditure shock
In empirical studies, findings on the effects of a government expenditure shock are
twofold depending on the identification scheme employed.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a narrative approach to identify the VAR model.
They interpret times of large military buildups in the US, the Korean war, the Vietnam
war and the Carter-Reagan buildup, as sudden and unforseen increases in government
1Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002) also pursue this road.
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expenditures. The resulting reactions of macroeconomic variables to those events are
thus interpreted as deviations from normal behavior. They find that output and hours
rise, while consumption and real wages fall. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004)
employ a similar methodology to estimate the impulse responses of macroeconomic
variables to a government expenditure shock and compare those to impulse responses
implied by a standard neoclassic model. The results indicate that hours worked rise,
investment shortly increases, while real wages and consumption decrease. Thus they
conclude that the standard neoclassic model can account reasonably well for the effects
of fiscal policy shocks. A similar conclusion is drawn by Edelberg et al. (1999), who
modify a neoclassic growth model distinguishing two types of capital, nonresidential
and residential capital.
A structural VAR approach is chosen by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify
a government expenditure shock. They require fiscal policy variables not to respond
immediately to other innovations in the economy, i.e. they employ the recursiveness as-
sumption. Their findings corroborate the results of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) concern-
ing output and hours worked, but are contradictious with respect to consumption and
real wages. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) also use a structural VAR, but do not consider
any timing restriction. Instead they employ sign restrictions to restrict the responses
of fiscal variables, while the responses of other macroeconomic variables are left open.
Besides the different methodology, they additionally allow for a pre-announcement of
fiscal policy shocks. Indeed, as it is widely acknowledged and mentioned, most fiscal
policy shocks are pre-announced. Their findings, however, confirm the results of Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002) except for consumption, which only shows a weak positive
response.
The debate about the empirical evidence was reopened by Ramey (2008)2. Her
paper takes up two issues. First, she stresses the importance of the composition of
government expenditures. The dataset used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) includes
government consumption as well as government investment expenditures. An increase
in the latter can be productive and potentially complement private consumption and
investment and therefore lead to a positive response of those variables. For these
reasons Ramey advocates to use defense spending as a proxy for government expen-
ditures in the VAR. Second, it states that the findings of the studies differ due to
pre-announcement effects, implying that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ a faulty
timing to identify the fiscal policy shock. In her paper, a neoclassic DSGE model
including a pre-announced government expenditure shock is set up and used to sim-
2The first version dates back to 2006.
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ulate artificial data. It is then demonstrated that, if the pre-announcement of the
shock is taken into account, a negative response of consumption is estimated. If not,
consumption appears to react positively, a clearly misleading result.
In his summary and discussion of the recent literature, Perotti (2007) acknowledges
the concerns with respect to the structural VAR methodology. As a possibility to
overcome its weaknesses he suggests to employ annual data and to distinguish between
shocks to defense spending and to civilian government spending. However, using annual
data, the recursiveness assumption that the fiscal sector does not react contemporarily
on the state of the economy might not hold anymore. But, as Perotti mentions, the
narrative approach has considerable weaknesses on its own: First, it suffers from a small
sample size, second, it is not entirely clear whether the whole change in government
expenditures is announced at once or whether it was a combination of small changes,
i.e. whether there were numerous revisions of the military budget, occurring one after
the other, causing private consumption to respond multiple times.
In Ravn et al. (2007) the authors dismiss Ramey’s critique towards the usage of
structural VAR models. They point out that shocks are by assumption orthogonal to
the information set and consequently identify a structural VAR as in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). However, two papers by Leeper and coauthors, which are concerned
with the mapping of estimated reduced form shocks of government expenditures into
structural innovations, put this notion into question. In Chung and Leeper (2007)
the authors discuss the importance of the intertemporal government budget constraint
for a structural VAR analysis. In order to estimate reduced form shocks that can be
mapped into structural innovations government debt and private investment should be
included into a VAR. Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2008) address the issue of identifying
pre-announced tax shocks. They show that due to a difference in the information set
of the agents in the economy and the information set of the econometrician aiming
at estimating the effects of pre-announced tax shocks, the estimated impulse response
functions are biased.
In chapter 3 I estimate a structural VAR. I therefore do not encounter the prob-
lems of the narrative approach. I resolve the problem of faulty timing assumptions
by not employing a recursive identification scheme, but by taking the pre-announced
nature of the shock explicitly into account and restrict the signs of key variables like
investment while leaving open the response of the variables of interest. The restrictions
are derived from a DSGE model exhibiting forward looking agents. The criticism of
Leeper et al. (2008) concerning the estimation of structural VAR is taken into account
by imposing the restrictions directly on the impulse response functions of the VAR.
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This formulation of a prior distribution on the impulse response functions of the VAR,
i.e. requiring them to be in line with the impulse response functions of the DSGE
model with forward looking agents, aims at closing the difference in the information
sets of the econometrician and agents of the economy.
1.2.5 Robust monetary policy
This section reviews the literature on how policy should be conducted if the policy
maker is uncertain about the true economic environment, i.e. when the true model is
not known to him.
In his seminal article Brainard (1967) investigated how monetary policy should be
conducted if the policy authority is uncertain about the parameters of the model. He
finds that in this case, optimal policy should react more cautious. Mccallum (1988)
studied the performance of policy rules across different estimated models. He simulated
data from each model with the historic estimated policy rule and alternative policy
rules under consideration. As a measure how well the policy rule performs, he compared
paths for the nominal gdp and inflation and judged them according to their smoothness.
He also finds that the policy maker should take model uncertainty into account and
determines characteristics of a policy rule performing well across different models.
A first rigorous treatment of optimal policy robust towards model uncertainty was
laid out by Hansen and Sargent (2001a), Hansen and Sargent (2001b) and Hansen and
Sargent (2003). 3 In their work a benchmark model is formulated and model uncer-
tainty is modeled by an additional error term. This formulation of misspecification
results in a set of models, more specifically a set of perturbations of the benchmark
model. The set of model perturbations is bounded by assuming that no perturbation
can deviate further from the benchmark model than a maximal statistical distance
measure. As a robust policy, they define a policy rule which minimizes a loss criterion
in the worst case realization of the shock process (minimax-approach).
Subsequently, two issues were discussed and dealt with in the literature. The first
issue was the formulation of model misspecification. This does not allow for the assess-
ment of structural model uncertainty, i.e. a discrete set of models considered by the
policy maker. Also, deviation from the benchmark, though statistically small, might
not be plausible economically. The second issue was the definition of a robust pol-
icy rule. Instead of focusing on one realization only, i.e. the worst case scenario, the
3In those papers the authors extended an approach already described in Hansen, Sargent, and
Tallarini (1999).
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whole distribution of outcomes is considered. This approach has been chosen already
by Brainard and became more apparent in the literature after Sims (2001) pointed to
potential pitfalls of the strategy suggested by Hansen and Sargent.
The results of the studies below often differ depending on the relevant source of
structural uncertainty4 and whether the minimax or the Bayesian approach is em-
ployed. It can be generally said that the optimal policy derived from a minimax
approach tends to be more aggressive and that parameter uncertainty tends to be less
relevant than uncertainty about the (non-nested) structure of the economy.
J. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) compare a robust policy design with struc-
tured and unstructured uncertainty. They find that optimal policy rules concerned
with structural model uncertainty are less aggressive than policy rules under unstruc-
tured uncertainty and that they are a good approximation of an estimated policy rule.
J. Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001) also interpret structured uncertainty as the
policy maker being uncertain about structural parameters of the model. Soderstrom
(2002) follows their interpretation but employs a Bayesian approach.
Levin and Williams (2003) analyze structural uncertainty as uncertainty about a
given, discrete set of models using Bayesian and minimax approach. They provide
evidence that a policy rule which is robust in the neighborhood of one reference model
performs poorly once the models differ more substantially. In Levin, Wieland, and
Williams (2003), the authors choose a Bayesian approach to derive a robust policy
rule across a set of five discrete models to investigate whether policy rules should be
based on forecasts rather than on outcomes. While in those papers the probability of
each model is chosen freely, Brock, Durlauf, and West (2005) consider a smaller set of
competing theories, but determine the model probabilities by estimating the posterior
probability of each model.
Onatski and Stock (2002) compare the performance of robust policy rules derived
via the minimax or Bayesian approach considering different structure types of uncer-
tainty, e.g. time-invariant perturbations and time-varying perturbations. Onatski and
Williams (2003) investigate optimal policy under parameter and model specification
uncertainty (lag length or error term properties) jointly and separately for a backward
looking model.
All those studies consider backward looking models only. The succeeding research
4In this section I concentrate on the discussion of the sources of uncertainty examined in chapter 4:
uncertainty about the parameters of the model and the specification of the model. One strand of the
literature stresses another source of uncertainty: data uncertainty. Among those, the most influential
studies are Rudebusch (2002), Coenen, Levin, and Wieland (2005), Svensson and Woodford (2004)
and Orphanides and Williams (2002).
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built on these methodologies but aimed at incorporating forward looking models for a
mainly two reasons. First to be more in comply with the Lucas’ critique and second in
models with a specified utility function and rational expectations, the criterion function
employed can be derived from the utility function of the household.
Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005) examine a medium scale DSGE
model as a benchmark model and additional frictions and features as perturbations.
This allows them to derive a micro founded loss criterion, i.e. the households’ uncondi-
tional expected utility is used as a welfare measure instead of an ad hoc loss function.
Employing a Bayesian approach they also consider parameter and model specification
uncertainty (the added frictions and features), but do not compute a policy rule which
is robust to the source of model specification uncertainty.
Küster and Wieland (2005) combine the minimax and the Bayesian approach and
derive a policy rule which is robust to model specification uncertainty, but do not
consider a micro-founded loss function. Giannoni (2007) uses a New Keynesian model
and the minimax approach to assess parameter uncertainty. He shows that the optimal
rule is likely to be more aggressive under parameter uncertainty. Coenen (2007) builds
on the work of Levin et al. (2003) and analyzes optimal policy if there are two models
under consideration implying a different degree of inflation persistence.
Levine, McAdam, Pearlman, and Pierse (2008) also use a medium-scale New Key-
nesian model to assess the importance of uncertainty about the degree of indexation
in wages and prices on the optimal conduct of policy for the Euro area. They compute
optimal simple rules that are robust to this source of specification uncertainty and find
similar to Levin et al. (2005) that monetary policy should respond to wage inflation.
Another branch of the literature inspects the optimal policy under model uncer-
tainty problem from a different angle. Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) and Cogley,
Colacito, Hansen, and Sargent (2008) evaluate a setup where the central bank faces
uncertainty about two competing aggregate macro models of which one is assumed to
be the true data generating process. The central bank seeks to maximize a quadratic
loss function, which is weighted with the two model probabilities. To serve this final
goal, the policy maker may employ its policy instrument to experiment, to learn and
therefore to update its belief about the true model over time. By experimenting sys-
tematically the central banker learns faster about the true model and reduces losses
due to model uncertainty - even if this leads to transitory suboptimal policies. The
authors find it is optimal for the policy maker to pursue this avenue.
Wieland (2000) discuss how the central bank should learn optimally if is is con-
fronted with parameter uncertainty. Orphanides and Williams (2007) analyze optimal
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policy if the agents posses imperfect knowledge about the economy and learn them-
selves.
In chapter 4 we employ a Bayesian approach to determine optimal monetary policy
under model uncertainty. We choose to model structured model uncertainty by exam-
ining a discrete set of models which consists of a benchmark New Keynesian model
and reasonable perturbations. Our loss function is micro-founded, i.e. it maximizes
households’ expected utility. We consider parameter uncertainty and model specifica-
tion separately and jointly. In contrast to the literature on learning, we do not take
a stand on the true data generating process. Since uncertainty about the true model
cannot be completely resolved by learning, we focus on how to conduct optimal policy
when uncertainty about the true model is persistent.
Chapter 4 is related to Levin et al. (2005) and to Levine et al. (2008). While
both work with a medium scale model, our benchmark is a stripped to bare bones
New Keynesian model. This modeling and estimation strategy allows us to quantify
the importance of each model component for explaining the data and for the optimal
conduct of monetary policy separately.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 2 addresses the issue of how to identify the structural shocks of a Vector
Autoregression (VAR) and how to estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model when it is not assumed to replicate the data generating process jointly.
It proposes a framework to estimate the parameters of the VAR model and the DSGE
model: the VAR model is identified by sign restrictions derived from the DSGE model;
the DSGE model is estimated by matching the corresponding impulse response func-
tions.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of a government expenditure shock on private
consumption and real wages. A Vector Autoregression is identified by sign restrictions
which are in turn derived from a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
This allows explicitly to model pre-announcement of a government expenditure shock
and its consequences on other economic variables. Since the sign restrictions are not
unique across the parameter space of the DSGE model, the DSGE model is estimated
by matching the corresponding impulse response functions of the VAR model. Thus the
VAR model and the DSGE model are estimated jointly. The results show a significant
positive response of private consumption and positive, though not significant, response
of real wages.
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In chapter 4 we assess the relevant sources of uncertainty for the optimal conduct
of monetary policy within (parameter uncertainty) and across a set of nested models
(specification uncertainty) using EU 13 data. As our main result, we find that running
optimal policy according to the model including all features and frictions does not guard
against model uncertainty. Parameter uncertainty matters only if the zero bound on
interest rates is explicitly taken into account. In any case, optimal monetary policy is
highly sensitive with respect to specification uncertainty implying substantial welfare
gains of a optimal rule that incorporates this risk.
Chapter 2
Matching Theory and Data:
Bayesian Vector Autoregression
and Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium Models
This chapter shows how to identify the structural shocks of a Vector Autoregression
(VAR) model while simultaneously estimating a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that is not assumed to replicate the data-generating process. It pro-
poses a framework for estimating the parameters of the VAR model and the DSGE
model jointly: the VAR model is identified by sign restrictions derived from the DSGE
model; the DSGE model is estimated by matching the corresponding impulse response
functions.
2.1 Introduction
How can we estimate the effects of an exogenous disturbance on the economy? In
recent years, two methodologies have become popular to answer this question: the
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model and the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model approach. Both have considerable advantages but also substantial
shortcomings. While on the one hand the VAR model is straightforward to estimate,
structural shocks cannot be recovered without additional assumptions. The DSGE
model, on the other hand, is of a structural form, i.e. it exhibits structural shocks, but
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it is difficult to determine its parameter values. In this chapter I present a methodology
for estimating the effects of exogenous disturbances that combines the advantages of
both approaches while overcoming their respective limitations.
I suggest identifying the VAR model with the help of the structural impulse response
functions of the DSGE model. Deriving the identifying restrictions from the DSGE
model ensures consistency of the identification of the VAR model with the implied
structural form of the DSGE model. Moreover, this approach allows the researcher
to lay out the assumptions underlying the identification of the VAR model explicitly
in the DSGE model and it enables her to include the different assumptions she wants
to discriminate between in the DSGE model. In this case a larger class of identifying
assumptions can be considered a priori and evaluated afterwards. At the same time,
the parameters of the DSGE model are estimated using information from the VAR
model. This has the advantage that the DSGE model does not have to be assumed to
represent the data-generating process nor to be fully stochastically specified. Therefore,
it need not exhibit as many structural shocks as there are observable variables to be
explained. Moreover, features and frictions which are not pertinent to the question
being examined can be ignored.
More precisely, the VAR model is identified using sign restrictions derived from
the structural impulse response functions of the DSGE model, while the DSGE model
is estimated by matching the corresponding impulse response functions. Transferring
the restrictions via sign restrictions is straightforward and easy to handle: for a given
parametrization of the DSGE model the signs of the impulse response functions of the
DSGE model define the restrictions for identifying the VAR model. Furthermore, when
using sign restriction it is not necessary for the complete number of structural shocks
of the VAR model to be identified, nor need the number of structural shocks of the
DSGE model correspond to the number of observable variables (variables in the VAR
model). The parameter vector of the DSGE model is in turn estimated by matching
the corresponding impulse response functions of the VAR model. Thus, it only needs
to represent the dynamics of the economy, not the complete data-generating process.
Consequently, features and lags which would otherwise have been included to match
outliers in the data, but which are not essential to the study, can be dropped.
In order to carry out this estimation procedure, it is necessary to describe the
joint distribution of the VAR model and the DSGE model. This chapter presents a
methodology for doing so. The methodology is first illustrated by means of a Monte
Carlo experiment and then applied to the data. I employ two different DSGE models
in each exercise. This is motivated by the fact that the simple DSGE model used in
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the Monte Carlo Experiment exhibits different signs in the response of each variable
depending on the parametrization, i.e. it is a perfect example, but is too stylized to
be estimated. The DSGE model used in the estimation exercise does not exhibit this
characteristic. Only the response of one variable, the one under investigation, switches
signs across the parameter space. However, it is straightforward to be taken to the
data.
More precisely, I simulate data from a fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) model
and re-estimate the parameters of the FTPL model and the impulse response functions
of the VAR model. The experiment shows that the true impulse response function is
indeed found. The FTPL model serves well for illustrating purposes since it can be
reduced to two equations in two variables and two shocks. The signs of both variables
vary depending on two parameters only. It is less well suited to bringing it to the
data. I therefore estimate a DSGE model recently laid out by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe,
Uribe, and Uuskula (2008) to investigate the response of inflation to a monetary policy
shock. This DSGE model suits well, since the response of inflation is either positive or
negative depending on its parametrization.
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section briefly reviews the relevant
literature. The third section outlines the general framework. The fourth section de-
scribes the probability distributions and the algorithm suggested to approximate them
in detail. The Monte Carlo Experiment is conducted in section 2.5. Section 2.6 applies
the methodology to the data and estimates the deep habit model. The last section
concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
After Sims’s seminal article (Sims, 1980) VAR models became one of the workhorses in
macroeconomics despite the problem of identifying structural shocks. Suggestions for
resolving the identification problem in a VAR model are manifold. Excellent surveys
have been written by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) and Rubio-Ramirez,
Waggoner, and Zha (2005). The approaches most closely related to the methodology
presented here are to identify the VAR model by sign restrictions (Uhlig, 2005a; Faust,
1998) or by probabilistic restrictions (Kociecki, 2005). Identification employing sign
restrictions attempts to restrict the signs of the impulse response functions of some
variables, while the variable of interest is unrestricted. In Kociecki (2005), a prior
distribution for the impulse response functions is formulated and transformed into a
prior distribution for the coefficients of the structural VAR model. Both approaches
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depend on the availability of a priori knowledge on the behavior of some impulse
response functions.
With regard to explicitly basing the identifying assumptions on DSGE models, two
strands of literature have emerged recently. One derives the identifying assumptions
from a DSGE model (Altig et al. (2002), DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004) and Sims
(2006b)); the other suggests, once the DSGE model is large enough, estimating the
DSGE model and thereby directly infering on the impulse responses (as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007)).
Due to advances in computational power, the estimation of DSGE models has lately
become very popular. The procedures differ depending on the econometric interpre-
tation of the DSGE model. Geweke (1999a) distinguishes between a strong and weak
interpretation. The former requires the DSGE model to provide a full description of the
data-generating process. It is the more common one nowadays despite its shortcom-
ings: first, the DSGE model already puts a lot of structure on the impulse responses
a priori, i.e. it often does not allow an investigation of the sign of a response and
might therefore not be appropriate as a research tool. Second, not all parameters of
the DSGE model can be identified (see Canova and Sala (2006) and Beyer and Farmer
(2006)). Finally, not all economists might feel comfortable with the assumption that
the DSGE model is a proper representation of the data-generating process. Instead, as
mentioned in Christiano et al. (2005), the DSGE model is best suited to replicate the
implied dynamics in the data, i.e. the impulse response functions. This is the weak
econometric interpretation. Following this road Ravn et al. (2007), Mertens and Ravn
(2008) as well as Ravn et al. (2008) estimate a DSGE model given the impulse response
function of the VAR model by minimizing the distance between the corresponding im-
pulse response functions. In contrast to them I do not consider the impulse response
functions of the VAR model as given, i.e. as identified a priori. In the case of timing or
long-run restriction the VAR model is identified and considering the impulse response
functions as given is justified. This chapter addresses the cases when the identifying
restrictions are not a priori clear or when the researcher chooses to use sign restric-
tions. Sign restrictions derived from a DSGE model will only in very rare cases be
unique across the parameter space of the DSGE model. In those cases the impulse
response functions are not identified and one cannot proceed as for instance in Ravn
et al. (2007), Mertens and Ravn (2008) or Ravn et al. (2008).
The methodology presented in this chapter is in the spirit of the former strand of
the literature, i.e. it bases the identification of the VAR model on restrictions derived
from the DSGE model. It differs from the existing literature in the following aspects.
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Altig et al. (2002) and DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004) employ the rotation matrix
of the DSGE model to identify the VAR model. To do this, the DSGE model has
to be fully stochastically specified. In the case of DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004),
additional dummy observations derived from the model are used to augment the VAR
model as suggested originally by Ingram and Whiteman (1994). While one can control
for the prior weight of the dummy observations, one cannot control for the prior weight
of the implied dynamics of the DSGE. The methodology proposed here differs from this
by not employing the implied rotation matrix of the DSGE model to identify the VAR
model, and therefore not requiring the DSGE model to be fully stochastically specified.
Sims (2006b) extends the idea to augment the VARmodel with dummy observations
in a more general framework. In his framework, the tightness of the prior can be
varied across frequencies and the number of structural shocks does not need to equal
the number of observations. The main difference to Sims (2006b) is that I suggest
employing the implied sign and shape restrictions (as described in Uhlig (2005a)) to
identify the VAR model as it is more simple and straightforward to use.
In recent studies, Lanne and Lütkepohl (2005), Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008), and
Lanne, Lütkepohl, and Maciejowska (2009) employ additional statistical properties of
the error terms to identify the VAR model. Lanne and Lütkepohl (2005) make use of
possible non-normal distributions of the error terms and extract additional identifying
information from this. Lanne and Lütkepohl (2008) use the insight of Rigobon (2003)
that a VAR model can be identified exploiting changes in volatility. Given any exact
identifying scheme this characteristics delivers over-identifying restrictions which can be
used to test different identification schemes. In Lanne et al. (2009) the authors combine
the properties of mixed normal distributions and regime changes in the volatility of the
error term and show that the VAR model is just identified, given that the shocks are
orthogonal across regimes and only the variances of the shocks change across regimes.
The methodology presented in this chapter does not hinge on special properties of the
error terms. It applies also in cases where the residuals are normally distributed.
2.3 Framework
In this section I set up the VAR model and its corresponding Vector Moving Average
(VMA) representation. The issue of how the structural impulse response can be identi-
fied is equivalent for both notations. For every period, the impulse response functions
of a VAR model can be expressed solely in terms of the coefficients of the VMA model
of that period. Setting up the framework in terms of the VMA representation makes
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the subsequent analytical calculations less demanding. Since the VAR model is con-
nected with the DSGE model via their implied dynamics, the notation necessary for
the DSGE model is introduced before the central idea of how to derive the joint pos-
terior distribution for the VAR model and the DSGE model is presented. Afterwards,
the framework is related to existing and nested approaches.
2.3.1 The VAR model and its corresponding VMA model
The structural VAR model containing m variables is defined as:
A−1Yt = A1Yt−1 + A2Yt−2 + . . . AlYt−l + εt, t = 1, . . . , T (2.1)
Yt is a m× 1 vector at date t = 1 + l, . . . , T , A and Ai are coefficient matrices of size
m×m and ε an i.i.d. one-step-ahead forecast error, distributed: ε ∼ N (0, Im×m).
The impulse response function ϕV of the VAR model is defined as the response of





where Θi denotes a moving average coefficient matrix. The impulse response function
of a VAR model to an innovation in variable i at horizon k ϕVjk can be computed directly
as:
ϕVjk = Θjk, (2.3)
where i depicts the i-th column. Due to the assumption that Σε = Im×m, this struc-
tural moving average representation cannot be estimated directly. Instead the reduced
form moving average representation with error term ut = Aεt, where u ∼ N (0,Σ), is





The factorization Σ = A′A does not have a unique solution, which leads to an identi-
fication problem of A.
It is important to note that any stationary moving average representation can be
approximated by a reduced form VAR model, which takes the form:
Yt = B1Yt−1 +B2Yt−2 + . . . BlYt−l + ut, t+ 1, . . . , T (2.5)
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with Bi = AAi, ut = Aεt and u ∼ N (0,Σ). While the framework is set up in terms of
VMA representation, it can be easily estimated as a VAR model.
2.3.2 The DSGE model
The fundamental solution of the DSGE model is given by1:
x̂t = T (θ̃)x̂t−1 +R(θ̃)zt, (2.6)
where z is a vector collecting the structural shocks of the DSGE model, while T (θ̃)
and R(θ̃) are matrices one obtains after solving a DSGE model with standard solution
techniques.
The impulse response functions of the variables in x to a structural shock i at
horizon k ϕDik are given by:
ϕDi,0 = R(θ̃)zi, k = 0 (2.7)
ϕDi,k = T (θ̃)ϕDk−1,i, k = 1, 2, ...K. (2.8)
The vector of structural parameters of the DSGE model defined as in (2.6) does
not contain any variances or covariances of a measurement error or any error term
emerging from confronting the DSGE model with the data, but only the variances of the
structural shocks. When the DSGE model is estimated by matching the corresponding
impulse response functions, an additional error term occurs. Its variance covariance
matrix is denoted by Ω and is also estimated. The vector comprising the vector of deep
parameters θ̃ and the vectorized Ω is defined as θ = [ θ̃ vec(Ω) ]′.
2.3.3 The idea in a nutshell
On the one hand, the distribution of the parameters of the DSGE model is estimated
by matching the corresponding impulse response function of the VMA model. On
the other hand, the distribution of structural impulse response functions of the VMA
model are identified by applying sign restrictions which are derived from the DSGE
model. Both distributions are therefore conditional distributions: they depend on a
realization of the impulse response function of the VMA model and on restrictions
from the DSGE model, i.e. a realization of a vector of structural parameters of the
1x̂t denotes the percentage deviation of the generic variable xt from a deterministic steady state x
chosen as approximation point.
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DSGE model, respectively. This section sets out how the conditional distributions can
be combined to derive the joint distribution.
The joint posterior distribution of θ and ϕ, given a matrix with time series obser-
vations Y , p(θ, ϕV |Y ), can be decomposed in different ways, depending on whether the
DSGE model is employed to identify the VMA model or not. In the latter case the
joint posterior is given by:
p(ϕV , θ|Y ) = p(ϕV |Y )p(θ|ϕV ). (2.9)
This equation can be justified twofold: In the case that the DSGE model is estimated
by matching the corresponding impulse response functions and not time series obser-
vations, the distribution of θ conditional on ϕV and Y is equal to the distribution of θ
conditional on ϕV only2. The second justification is shown by Smith (1993) and DelNe-
gro and Schorfheide (2004) and discussed in section 2.3.4, when setting the framework
in a broader context.
In the case that the likelihood of the VMA model impulse response functions de-
pends on restrictions from the DSGE model, p(θ, ϕV |Y ) is given as:
p(ϕV , θ|Y ) = p(ϕV |θ, Y )p(θ|Y ). (2.10)
The framework presented in this chapter is based on the argument that both distribu-
tions are at least proportionally equal:
p(ϕV |Y )p(θ|ϕV ) ∝ p(ϕV |θ, Y )p(θ|Y ), (2.11)
and can be approximated sufficiently well by Monte Carlo Markov Chain Methods.
Denote the Jacobian matrix collecting the derivatives of ϕV with respect to Φ by
J(ϕV → A,Φ). Considering the relationship between the coefficients of the VMA
model and the impulse response function of the VMA model (ΦiA = ϕVi ):
p(ϕV |θ, Y ) = p(A,Φ|θ, Y )J(ϕV → A,Φ), (2.12)
2It then holds:
p(θ|ϕV , Y )p(ϕV |Y ) = p(ϕV |Y )p(θ|ϕV )
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equation (2.11) is given by:
p(ϕV |Y )p(θ|ϕV ) ∝ p(A,Φ|θ, Y )J(ϕV → A,Φ)p(θ|Y ). (2.13)
Note that the conditional distributions of interest (p(θ|ϕV ) and p(A,Φ|θ, Y )J(ϕV →
A,Φ) are on different sides of the proportionally sign in (2.13). It is therefore possible
to employ a Gibbs sampling algorithm, i.e. to draw from two conditional distributions
in order to evaluate the joint distribution. In the following section I will first relate the
approach to existing methodologies before I describe both conditional distributions in
detail.
2.3.4 Nested approaches
Taking a broader perspective, several closely-related methodologies evolve as special
cases of this approach: the pure sign restriction approach of Uhlig (2005a), the DSGE-
VAR methodology of DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004) and the case of probabilistic
restrictions of Kociecki (2005).
The latter arises if the restrictions derived from the DSGE model are constant across
the parameter space. Then it is possible to generate a prior distribution for the impulse
response functions of the VAR model from the DSGE model and use it as a prior for
the parameters of the VAR model. Since, as pointed out by Kociecki (2005), the sign
restriction approach is a special case of the probabilistic approach, this methodology
is also nested. The sign restriction approach arises if the prior distribution for some
impulse response function exhibits a very small variance, i.e. determines the sign of
this impulse. It is equivalent to using an indicator function placing zero probability
weight on VAR model parameter regions whenever the a priori sign restrictions are
not satisfied. Therefore, in the case that the DSGE model determines constant sign
restrictions across the parameter space it is not necessary to draw from the conditional
distribution of θ. One only needs to draw from p(A,B|θ, Y ).
The DSGE-VAR methodology arises once the framework is rewritten in terms of
the parameters instead of the impulse response functions of the VAR model, and in
the case that the DSGE model is fully stochastically specified.
p(A,B|Y )p(θ|A,B) ∝ p(A,B|θ, Y )p(θ|Y ) (2.14)
The right-hand side is the expression used to evaluate the joint posterior distribution
of p(A,B, θ|Y ): since the DSGE model is fully stochastically specified it is possible
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to derive an analytical solution for the marginal posterior of θ. The decomposition
on the left-hand side again legitimates the decomposition used in (2.9): the posterior
distribution of the parameters of the VAR does not depend on the vector of structural
parameters of the DSGE model. As argued in DelNegro and Schorfheide (2004) and
Smith (1993), A and B can then be used to learn about the parameter vector θ.
2.4 Evaluating the joint distribution
In this section the conditional distributions employed in the estimation process are
described in detail. I start by describing the distribution of the VMA model conditional
on the parameter vector of the DSGE model. Then the distributions of the parameters
of the DSGE conditional on the impulse response functions of the VMA model are set
out.
2.4.1 Conditional distribution of the VMA model parameters
The conditional distribution described in this section is p(ϕV |θ, Y ) from the right-hand
side of (2.11). It is conditional since the prior distribution for the impulse response
functions p(ϕV ) = p(ϕV |θ) is derived from the DSGE model3 The posterior distribution
of the structural impulse responses ϕV is obtained by combining the coefficient esti-
mates of the reduced-form VMA model Φ with an impulse matrix A. In order to write
this distribution in terms of the reduced-form VMA model coefficients and the impulse
matrix, it has to be scaled by the Jacobian J(ϕV → A,Φ). The prior distribution for
the structural impulse response function is set out and the Jacobian is derived in the
first subsection.
Afterwards, the distribution p(A,Φ|θ) is decomposed into a conditional distribution
of the VMA model coefficients and a marginal distribution of the impulse matrix A:
p(Φ, A|θ) = p(Φ|A, θ)p(A|θ). (2.15)
Combining this prior distribution with the likelihood yields the posterior distribution
p(A,Φ|θ, Y )J(ϕV → A,Φ). The likelihood is described in the third part of this section.
The resulting posterior distribution is difficult to evaluate for various reasons: given
the restrictions, it is, to the best of my knowledge, not possible to draw the impulse
matrix A of the VMA model for a reasonably large set of variables. It is not possible
3The impulse response functions of the DSGE model define a probability distribution of impulse
response functions dependent on θ.
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if only submatrices, i.e. fewer shocks than variables, are considered. This also implies
that the distributions conditional on A are not defined, causing problems in the case
that the restrictions are formulated for more than one period.
I therefore suggest in the fourth section deriving the restrictions from the DSGE
model as sign restrictions. For each realization of the impulse response function of
the DSGE model the corresponding sign restrictions are put on the VMA model. The
coefficients of the VMA model are conditional on the impulse response functions of the
DSGE model, similar to Uhlig (2005a), where the posterior distribution of the VAR
parameters is multiplied by an indicator function that puts zero probability in param-
eter regions whenever the restrictions derived from the DSGE model are not satisfied.
The distribution of parameters of the DSGE model θ defines a set of restrictions put
on the parameters of the VMA model. This conditional prior distribution combined
with the likelihood then yields the posterior distribution. A further simplification is
considered in the concluding part of this section: the approximation of the VMA model
by a VAR model.
2.4.1.1 The Jacobian J(ϕV → A,Φ)
Denote the impulse response functions in period k as ϕVk . If all shocks are included,
the matrix is of size m×m, where the entry i, j corresponds to the response of variable
i to an innovation in variable j. The prior for the impulse responses has to be specified
for as many periods as there are impulse response functions to be estimated. The



















V̄00 V̄01 V̄02 · · · V̄0l
V̄10 V̄11 V̄12 · · · V̄1k
V̄20 V̄21 V̄22 · · · V̄2k
...




The probability distribution p(ϕ0, ϕ1, ..., ϕk) can be decomposed into a marginal dis-
tribution of p(ϕ0) and succeeding conditional distributions:
p(ϕ0, ϕ1, ..., ϕk) = p(ϕk|ϕk−1 · · ·ϕ0)p(ϕk−1|ϕk−2 · · ·ϕ0) · · · p(ϕ1|ϕ0)p(ϕ0), (2.17)
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with
p(vec(ϕ0)) = N (vec(ϕ̄0), ¯̄V00) (2.18)
p(vec(ϕi|vec(ϕi−1) · · · vec(ϕ0)) = N (θi,∆ii), i = 1 · · · k, (2.19)
and θi and ∆ii abbreviate the usual definitions for conditional distributions:
θi = vec(ϕ̄) +
[
V̄i0 · · · V̄ii−1
] 
V̄00 · · · V̄0i−1
... . . . ...







∆ii = V̄ii −
[
V̄i0 · · · V̄ii−1
] 
V̄00 · · · V̄0i−1
... . . . ...







In order to write the prior distribution in terms of the reduced form coefficients it is
necessary to scale the probability distribution with the Jacobian:
p(ϕ) = p(f(Φ))J(ϕ⇒ Φ). (2.20)
The relationship between structural and reduced form moving average coefficients is
given by:
ϕ0 = A (2.21)
ϕi = ΦiA, i = 1 · · · k (2.22)
.
Note that I have left out Φ0 since this matrix is normalized to an identity matrix by
assumption. This also indicates that it is not possible to infer on ϕ0 from the estimated
reduced VMA model.
The Jacobian is calculated in the following way. Applying the vec-operator yields:4
vec(ϕi) = (A′ ⊗ Im×m)vec(Φi).
4Note that vec(AB) = (I ⊗A)vec(B) = (B′ ⊗ I)vec(A))
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The Jacobian matrix is defined as:





∂vec(Φ1) · · ·
∂vec(ϕ1)








Due to the fact that ∂vec(ϕi)
∂vec(Φj) = 0 for j > i, the matrix becomes a block triangular
matrix and the determinant is given by:




| · · · |∂vec(ϕk)
∂vec(Φk)
|
J(ϕ→ Φ) = |(A′ ⊗ Im×m)|k = |A|mk (2.24)
(2.25)
2.4.1.2 Decomposition of the distribution p(Φ, A) = p(Φ|A)p(A)
A prior distribution for the reduced form coefficients conditional on ϕ0 = A is formu-
lated as:
p(A,Φ1, ...,Φk) = p(Φk|Φk−1 · · ·Φ0)p(Φk−1|Φk−2 · · ·A) · · · p(ϕ1|A)p(A)J(ϕ→ Φ),
(2.26)
where
p(vec(A)) = N (vec(ϕ̄0), ¯̄V00) (2.27)
p(vec(Φi)|vec(Φi−1) · · · vec(A)) = N (Φ̄i, ¯̄Vii) (2.28)
with
Φ̄i = (A′ ⊗ Im×m)θi (2.29)
¯̄Vii = (A−1
′ ⊗ Im×m)∆ii(A−1
′ ⊗ Im×m). (2.30)
2.4.1.3 The likelihood for the reduced-form coefficients
Consider the VMA(k) process:
Yt = ut + Φ1ut−1 + Φ2ut−2 + · · ·+ Φkut−k. (2.31)
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This can be written in state space form:
ξt+1 = Fξt + Ut+1 (2.32)









0 0 · · · 0 0
Im 0 · · · 0 0
0 Im · · · 0 0
... ... . . . ... ...














Given an initial condition for y0 and Σ0, the likelihood can then be written as:
p(yT , . . . , y0|Φ1, ...,Φk,Σ) = p(yT |yT−1 . . . y0,Φ1, ...,Φk,Σ) · · · p(y0|Φ1, ...,Φk,Σ),
(2.34)
where:
p(yt|yt−1 . . . y0,Φ1, ...,Φk) = N (yt|t−1,Σt|t−1). (2.35)
yt|t−1 and Σt|t−1 denote the optimal forecast at time t, which is a function of the
coefficient matrices. The impulse matrix A is not part of the likelihood function,
instead the variance covariance matrix Σ = A′A.
2.4.1.4 The posterior distribution
The posterior of the reduced form coefficients is derived by combining (2.34) and (2.26):
p(Φ1, · · ·Φk, A|θ, Y ) = p(yT , . . . , y0|Φ1, ...,Φk,Σ)p(A,Φ1, ...,Φk|θ). (2.36)
To identify the impulse matrix A from the likelihood estimate of the variance covariance
matrix I utilize the prior distribution for ϕ0 = A derived from the DSGE model in the
following way: the impulse matrix Ă is defined as a sub matrix of A of size m×n where
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n is the number of structural shocks under consideration, i.e. the structural shock of
interest as well as other shocks necessary to distinguish this shock. These shocks have
to be included in the DSGE model as well. In order to indicate that the restrictions
put on A rely on the model and therefore its parameter vector θ, I write Ă(θ). Given
a number of rowvectors qj forming an orthonormal matrix Q and the lower Cholesky
decomposition of Σ, Ã, Ă(θ) is defined as: Ă(θ) = ÃQ(θ).
Every realization of the vector of the parameters of the DSGE model θ is associated
with an impulse response function of the DSGE model and a realization of Ă(θ). A
sequence of realizations of θ yields a sequence of restrictions and therefore a related
prior probability distribution. Given a realization of an impulse response function of
the DSGE model ϕD the posterior distribution is evaluated the following way:
1. Derive the sign restrictions from ϕD.
2. Draw a realization of Φ and Σ from the distribution (2.36).
3. Calculate Ã and draw Q(θ) from a uniform distribution such that Ă(θ) = ÃQ(θ)
fulfils the sign restriction.
4. Given A, compute the structural impulse responses from ϕi = ΦiA, i = 1 · · · k.
2.4.1.5 The conditional distribution of the VAR model
Estimating a VAR model is less complicated. In practice whenever possible, i.e. if
the VMA model is stationary, it is approximated by a VAR model5. In this section I
therefore briefly lay out the approach for this case.
As shown by Uhlig (1997), the prior distribution for B and Σ can be specified
choosing appropriate B0, N0, S0, v0 as:
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N (vec(B0),Σ⊗N−10 ) (2.37)
Σ ∼ IW(v0S0, v0). (2.38)
Denote the maximum likelihood estimates of Σ and B as Σ̃ = 1
T
(Y −XB̂)′(Y −XB̂)
5I will employ the expression VAR model in the remaining sections too.
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and B̂ = (X ′X)−1X ′Y . The posterior is then given as6:
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N (vec(BT ),Σ⊗N−1T ) (2.39)
Σ ∼ IW(vTST , vT ), (2.40)
where
NT = N0 +X ′X (2.41)









(B0 − B̂)′N0N−1T X ′X(B0 − B̂) (2.43)
vT = v0 + T. (2.44)
Drawing from a joint posterior of B, Σ and Ă(θ) is conducted in the following steps:
1. The impulse responses of the DSGE determine the restrictions put on Ă(θ).
2. Draw B and Σ from the posterior (2.39) and (2.40).
3. Calculate Ã and draw Q(θ) from a uniform distribution such that Ă(θ) = ÃQ(θ)
fulfills the sign restriction.
2.4.2 The conditional distribution of the DSGE model param-
eters
Since the DSGE model is not assumed to be a proper representation of the data-
generating process, the structural parameters are not estimated by matching the data
Y . Instead, the DSGE model is assumed to replicate the implied dynamics of the data,
i.e. the impulse response functions of the VAR model. This induces matching a given
realization of the impulse response function of the VAR model to the i-th shock at
horizon k, ϕVi,k:
ϕVi,k = ϕDi,k(θ̃) + ωi,k. (2.45)
Stacking the impulse response functions over 1, .., K periods together yields:
ϕVi = ϕDi (θ̃) + ωi (2.46)
6A formal derivation is given in appendix A.1
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with all vectors of dimensionm∗k×1. The error term ωi has the property E[ωiω′i] = Ωωi ,
which is part of the vector θ. Since the structural shocks are assumed to be independent,
the probability of p(θ|ϕV ) can be written as:
p(θ|ϕV ) = p(θ|ϕV1 , ϕV2 , · · ·ϕVi ) = p(θ|ϕV1 )p(θ|ϕV2 ) · · · p(θ|ϕVi ). (2.47)
The vector θ is estimated in two steps: First Ωωi is estimated, and afterwards the
vector of deep parameters θ̃. The variance covariance is estimated by making use of
the relationship:
ωi = ϕVi − ϕDi (θ̃). (2.48)
For every realization of ϕVi a reasonable number of draws from p(θ) is taken7, and the
corresponding impulse response function ϕDi (θ̃) and the error terms are computed. Ω̃ωi




















Combining this likelihood with a prior distribution for θ yields the posterior distribu-
tion.
One potential issue arising when matching impulse response functions of a DSGE
model and a VAR model was pointed out by McGrattan, Chari, and Kehoe (2005): the
implied VAR model representation of the DSGE model might be of infinite order but
the empirical VAR model is often of lower order. One solution, suggested by Cogley
and Nason (1995), is to simulate artificial time series from the DSGE model, estimate
a VAR model from the artificial time series and compare this VAR model to the VAR
model estimated from the actual data.
2.4.3 Sampling algorithm for the joint posterior distribution
In order to evaluate the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the DSGE
model and the VAR model I propose a Gibbs sampling algorithm combined with a
Metropolis-Hastings step. The Gibbs sampling algorithm allows to draw from the con-
ditional distributions laid out in detail in sections 2.4.1.4 and 2.4.2. The Metropolis-
Hastings step is an acceptance/rejection sampling algorithm that determines the prob-
7In the simulation and estimation I used 50 draws per realization.
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ability space in which the implied impulse response functions of the DSGE model and
those of the VAR model coincide. It is carried out I times.
The algorithm can roughly be summarized in the following way. At each iteration
i = 1, . . . , I d-draws are taken from the conditional densities p(θ|ϕV )i and p(ϕV |θ, Y )i.8
These draws form candidate distributions p(θ|ϕV )ĩ and p(ϕV |Y, θ)ĩ. Via acceptance
and rejection, the candidate distributions are compared with p(θ|ϕV )i and p(ϕV |θ, Y )i.
Draws with higher posterior density are kept and form the new densities p(θ|ϕV )i+1
and p(ϕV |θ, Y )i+1. More precisely, at each iteration i = 1, . . . , I the algorithm involves
the following steps:
1. Draw j = 1 . . . d times from p(θ|ϕV )i.
2. For every realization θj of the vector of deep parameters of the DSGE model
derive the corresponding sign restriction.
3. Draw Σj from (2.40) and Bj from (2.39). Compute the lower Cholesky decompo-
sition and find an Ăj = ÃjQj fulfilling the sign restrictions from ϕDj (θ̃j). Compute
ϕVj , yielding p(ϕV |Y, θ)ĩ.
4. For every realization of ϕVj derived in step 3 find the θ that maximizes (2.49)
combined with the prior p(θ). This yields p(θ|ϕV )ĩ.
5. Do acceptance-rejection by comparing p(θ|ϕV )ĩ with p(θ|ϕV )i−1. Keep the corre-
sponding vectors from p(ϕV |θ)ĩ. This yields p(θ|ϕV )i+1 and p(ϕV |θ)i+1.
6. Start again at 1.
The chain converges if p(θ|ϕV )i and p(θ|ϕV )i−1 and also p(ϕV |θ)i and p(ϕV |θ)i−1
are similar, i.e. the acceptance rate is low.
In the remaining sections of the chapter I will discuss the properties of the sampling
algorithm in more detail using a Monte Carlo experiment, i.e. specify precisely the
number of iterations and the convergence of the algorithm. Afterwards I will put the
methodology to work and confront it with the data.
2.5 Example 1: A Monte Carlo Experiment
In order to illustrate the methodology suggested above I use a simple fiscal theory of
the price level (FTPL) model as described in Leeper (1991) to identify the response of
8 In the first iteration step p(θ|ϕV )1 = p(θ).
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inflation to a monetary policy shock, i.e. an unexpected increase in the interest rate.
The FTPL model is chosen because it can be reduced to two equations in real debt and
inflation. It is the most simple DSGE model exhibiting different signs of the impulse
response functions depending on two parameters only. Furthermore, the solution and
properties of the FTPL model are well known by economists, which makes the example
very transparent.
I simulate data from the FTPL model and using the methodology outlined above
show that the ’true’ signs of the impulse response functions and the corresponding
distribution of the parameters of the FTPL model are found, even if the chain is
initialized with a wrong guess.
2.5.1 The FTPL model
The representative household maximizes its utility in consumption 9 cF and real money
balances mF :
Ut = log(cF,t) + log(mF,t) (2.50)
subject to the budget constraint:







where bF denotes bond holdings, τF lump sum taxes, yF income, RF nominal interest
rates and πF inflation. Small letters denote real variables, capital letters nominal
variables.
The government has to finance government expenditures gF by issuing bonds, col-
lecting taxes and seignorage. The budget constraint is therefore given by:







The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate RF following the interest rate
rule:
RF,t = αF0 + αFπF,t + zF,t, (2.53)
where α0F and αF are policy coefficients. zF denotes a monetary policy shock, specified
9All variables and parameters associated with the FTPL model are labeled with a F .
34 CHAPTER 2
as
zF,t = ρF,1zF,t−1 + εF1,t (2.54)
εF1,t ∼ N(0, σF1). (2.55)
The fiscal authority sets taxes according to:
τF,t = γF0 + γF bF,t−1 + ψF,t, (2.56)
where again γF0 and γ denote policy coefficients. The innovation in fiscal policy has
the following characteristics:
ψF,t = ρF2ψF,t−1 + εF2,t (2.57)
εF2,t ∼ N(0, σF2). (2.58)
The model can be linearized and summarized by two equations10:
π̃F,t+1 = βFαF π̃F,t + βF zF,t (2.59)
b̃F,t + ϕF1π̃F,t + ϕF3zF,t + ψF,t = (β−1F − γF )b̃F,t−1 − ϕF4zF,t−1 − ϕF2π̃F,t−1. (2.60)
2.5.2 Dynamics of the FTPL model
The dynamics of the system depend on whether fiscal and monetary policy are active
or passive, i.e. they depend on the policy parameters αF and γF only. Different policy
regimes emerge for:
• |αFβF | > 1 and |β−1F − γF | < 1 for active monetary (AM) and passive fiscal (PF)
policy. This will be referred to as regime I.
• |αFβF | < 1 and |β−1F − γF | > 1 for active fiscal (AF) and passive monetary (PM)
policy. This will be referred to as regime II.
• AM/AF and PF/PM. These cases are not considered here.
Both policy regimes imply different signs of the impulse response function for inflation
and real debt. In regime I a monetary policy shock (an unanticipated increase in
the nominal interest rate) will lead to a negative response of inflation and a positive
response of real debt. A fiscal policy shock (an unanticipated increase in taxes) will
10See appendix A.2 for a derivation.
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have no effect on inflation and decrease the real debt. In regime II, a monetary policy
shock leads to an increase in inflation and an initial decrease in real debt. A fiscal
policy shock has a negative effect on both variables. Impulse response functions for each
shock, regime and variable are plotted in appendix A.5 together with the corresponding
distributions of αF and γF .
2.5.3 Specification and Identification of the VAR
The VAR model consists of two variables, inflation πF and real debt bF , with no
constant or time trend: yF,t = [πF,tbF,t]′. The VAR model with one lag is given by:
yF,t = ByF,t−1 + uF,t
E[uF,tu′F,t] = ΣF .
Ordering the fiscal policy shock first and the monetary policy shock second, based on
the model the following characteristics of the impulse matrix AF have to hold:
• If regime I holds:
– Fiscal policy shock: AF,11 = 0 AF,21 < 0.
– Monetary policy shock: AF,21 < 0 and AF,22 > 0.
• If regime II holds:
– Fiscal policy shock: AF,11 < 0 AF,21 < 0.
– Monetary policy shock: AF,21 > 0 and AF,22 < 0.
Since the sign of the reaction of real debt to a monetary policy shock does not identify
the shock in the case of regime II, the monetary policy shock is ordered second, implying
that both variables have to fulfil the sign restriction for a fiscal policy shock first. Then
the sign of the response of real debt is restricted, while the response of inflation is left
open.
2.5.4 A Monte Carlo Experiment
I simulate data from the model over 200 periods with αF = 0.5 andγF = −0.00001, i.e.
the case of active fiscal and passive monetary policy. I choose the prior distribution of
αF and γF based on estimates by Davig and Leeper (2005):
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Parameter mean(I) standard deviation(I) mean(II) standard deviation(II)
αF 1.308 0.253 0.522 0.175
γF 0.0136 0.012 -0.0094 0.013
Table 2.1: Prior distribution for parameters of the FTPL model
The prior distribution is plotted in figure A.1. The model fulfills the requirements
for investigating the question of how inflation reacts after a monetary policy shock:
depending on the parameterization it allows for qualitatively different reactions of
inflation, and the DSGE model incorporates all other shocks necessary, here the fiscal
policy shock, to distinguish the shock of interest. The corresponding impulse responses
for each regime are plotted in appendix A.5: Figures A.2 and A.3 provide Bayesian
impulse response plots for draws from the prior distribution of regime I and figures
A.4 and A.5 for draws from the prior distribution of regime II.
The sampling algorithm is specified by setting d = 200 to approximate the candidate
distribution. Afterwards, I = 50 and 200 draws are taken at each iteration. Since the
data are simulated from regime II, the outcome expected is the distribution of regime
II, with the corresponding impulse responses of inflation and real debt for a fiscal policy
shock and real debt for a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, inflation should rise in
response to a monetary policy shock.
As figure A.6 indicates, this is indeed the case, even though I initialize the chain
with a wrong guess. The posterior distribution of αF and γF stems from regime II only.
Figure A.7 shows the response to a fiscal policy shock and figure A.8 the response to
a monetary policy shock. Inflation is indeed increasing.
2.6 Example 2: Application to the data
In this section I take the methodology to the data. Since the FTPL model is too
stylized I introduce another very simple DSGE model: the deep habit model. This
model was employed by Ravn et al. (2008) to answer the question whether a simple
model can account for the so-called price puzzle, i.e. the increase of inflation after a
contractionary monetary policy shock. This DSGE model is able to generate a positive
as well as a negative response of inflation after a monetary policy shock.
I flip the question and explore whether prices increase or decrease after a monetary
policy shock using the methodology set out in this chapter. I identify the monetary
policy shock by employing sign restrictions from the DSGE model. The response of
inflation will be left open.
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In the remaining part of the section, first the DSGE model is set up and its dynamics
are described. Finally, the DSGE model and the VAR model are estimated jointly.11
2.6.1 Deep habits model
The DSGE model consists of households, firms and a monetary authority. In the fol-
lowing, these parts of the DSGE model are characterized, the equilibrium is defined and
the impulse response functions are analyzed. All variables and parameters associated
with the deep habits model are labeled with an H.
2.6.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], which are all identical and
infinitively lived. Household j’s preferences are given by:
























where βH denotes the discount factor, κH the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, γH a preference weight on households j’s labor supply and xjH,t denotes the
consumption basket. Equation (2.62) defines the deep habit: consumption of variety
i is related to the past aggregate of this variety. Deep habits therefore imply that the
level of marginal utility of individual goods varies. The aggregate is assumed to be
exogenously given. The parameter θdH measures the importance of the habit.















Households act as monopolistically competitive labor unions in the labor market
11The (uncommented) matlab codes are available upon request and will (hopefully) be made avail-
able commented on my webpage soon.
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earning the wage rateW jH . They face costs of changing wages ζHw, which are quadratic
in the deviation of nominal wage growth from an index factor π̃Hw,t. The index factor
evolves according to:
π̃Hw,t = ϑHwπ?Hw + (1− νHw)πHw,t−1, (2.66)
where νHw measures the extent of wage indexation.
Households own firms and receive dividends DjH,t, and furthermore have access to
a nominal risk-free bond BH yielding the gross nominal interest rate RH .





















Firms are monopolistically competitive. Firm i produces output using the following
production function:
yHi,t = hHi,t. (2.68)







Given the price W jH,t for h
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From (2.73) the main mechanism becomes apparent: firms have an incentive to lower
prices today if they expect future demand to be high relative to current demand.
Additionally, the firm increases its weight on the price elastic term and therefore its
price elasticity of demand.
Firms face quadratic adjustment costs ζHp when changing nominal prices. Firms’






















Nominal prices are indexed by π̃H,t, which evolves according to:
π̃H,t = νHpπ?H + (1− νHp)πH,t−1. (2.75)
2.6.1.3 Monetary Policy and market clearing
Monetary policy aims at stabilizing deviations in inflation and output from their steady
state values π?H and y?H . It sets the policy coefficients ρHr, αH,π and αH,y according to
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the simple interest rate rule:
RH,t = R?H+ρH,r(RH,t−1−R?H)+(1−ρHr)
[




















cH,t = yH,t. (2.79)
The aggregate resource constraint is given by:
yH,t = hH,t. (2.80)
2.6.1.4 Equilibrium definition
I follow Ravn et al. (2008) by concentrating on the symmetric equilibrium in which all
consumers make the same choice over consumption, set the same wage and all firms
set the same prices.
A recursive equilibrium is then defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given initial values PH,0 > 0 and WH,0, the recursive laws of motion
for price and wage indexation (2.75) and (2.66) and a monetary policy, a rational
expectations equilibrium (REE) for RH,t ≥ 1, is a set of sequences {yH,t, cH,t, hH,t,
xH,t, wH,t, PH,t,RH,t}∞t=t0
(i) that solve the firms’ problem (2.74) with s.t. (2.73),
(ii) that maximize households’ utility (2.61) s.t. (2.72), (2.67) and a No-Ponzi-
scheme condition,
(iii) that clear the goods market (2.79) and labor market, i.e. (2.78) and (2.77) hold,
(iv) and that satisfy the aggregate resource constraint (2.80).
The DSGE model is loglinearized around its steady state. An overview of the
steady state and the loglinearized equations are given in Appendix A.3.1 and A.3.2
respectively.
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2.6.1.5 Prior distribution of the parameters and impulse response func-
tions
I estimate only those structural parameters crucial for the response of inflation12. For
those parameters, prior distributions are specified which allow for a wide range of
impulse response functions of the deep habits model. The parameters not estimated
are calibrated as in Ravn et al. (2008). An overview can be found in appendix A.3.3.
2.6.2 Estimation
In figure A.9 the impulse response functions of the DSGE model when drawing from
the prior distribution are plotted.13 The signs of all the impulse response functions
except the response of interest (inflation) are constant, i.e. for every draw from the
parameter distribution of the DSGE model consumption, real wages and output will be
decreasing while the interest rate increases. In order to distinguish the characterization
of the shock from other shocks, I compare the combination of signs with combinations
implied by other common shocks. These shocks are taken from Smets and Wouters
(2003). The sign restriction of the monetary policy shock implied by the deep habits
model are different from the signs of common shocks except for the price markup
shock in Smets and Wouters (2003). Even though it is the shock exhibiting the smallest
variance, I further include adjusted reserves as well as the price index of crude materials
into the VAR model to distinguish the estimated shock (following Mountford and Uhlig
(2005)). While the former is restricted to react negativly, the latter is left unrestricted.
Since both variables have no counterparts in the DSGE model, they are not matched.
Overall, the VAR model consists of 7 variables: real GDP, real personal consumption,
real wages, interest rates, adjusted reserves, the GDP deflator and the price index of
crude materials. A complete description of the time series is given in Appendix A.4.
The prior distribution of the VAR model is specified as a flat prior.
Before the DSGE model is estimated, I perform a Monte Carlo experiment to ensure
the validity of the methodology, the identification and the specification of the sampling
algorithm. The candidate distribution for the vector of deep parameters will be the
prior distribution. In the Monte Carlo experiment I set I = 20 and draw n = 200
times at each iteration. First only a subvector of the parameters of the DSGE model
consisting of θd, η, ζw, and ζp is estimated. The results are displayed in table A.1
(columns 6 and 7) of appendix A.3.3 and show that all parameters are estimated
12Ravn et al. (2008) also only estimate a subset of the structural parameters.
13All figures are provided in appendix A.5.
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very precisely around their true values (column 5). This is a very encouraging result,
especially since the prior distribution is not centered around the true value.
Adding more parameters to the vector of estimated parameters has two effects.
This is demonstrated by supplementing the vector of structural parameters with the
coefficients of the Taylor rule (ρHr, αHπ, αHy) and the inflation indexation parameter
νHp. On the one hand, this increases the flexibility of the DSGE model and therefore
increases the ability to fit the impulse response functions of the data. Figure A.10
provides plots of the impulse response function of the DSGE model and the VAR
model. Both coincide and, more importantly, the ’true’ impulse response function for
inflation, i.e. the impulse response function for the parameter vector at which the
DSGE model is simulated, is estimated. On the other hand, as shown in table A.1
columns 8 and 9, the precision of the estimation is slightly blurred.
Given the encouraging results, I take the methodology to the data. At every itera-
tion I take n = 200 draws, the number of iterations is set to I = 20. Table A.1 column
10 and 11 report the mean and the standard deviation of the posterior distribution
respectively. The estimation results for the posterior mean of some of the parame-
ters of the DSGE model are very similar to those obtained by Ravn et al. (2008)14:
ηH = 2.47 (2.48), ζHp = 14.89 (14.47), ζHp = 42.50 (40.89),αHr = 0.01(0.04). I find
slightly different estimates for the deep habit parameter θdH = 0.72 (0.85), the infla-
tion indexation parameter νHp = 0.1 (0), and the policy coefficients ρHr = 0.81 (0.74)
and αHπ = 1.56, (1.26). Figure A.12 displays the impulse response functions: since the
parameters of the DSGE model are estimated similarly, the response of inflation is pos-
itive and significant for 68% probability bands.15 However, while the graph indicates a
positive response for the mean response of the VAR model, the uncertainty bands give
rise to the conclusion that a negative response of inflation to a monetary shock is as
likely as positive one.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has laid out a methodology for identifying the structural shocks of a
Vector Autoregression (VAR) model while at the same time estimating a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that is not assumed to replicate the
data-generating process. To this end it has presented a framework for jointly estimating
the parameters of a VAR model and a DSGE model.
14For comparison I report their findings in brackets after my estimates.
15It is not significant for 100% probability bands.
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The VAR model is identified based on restrictions from the DSGE model, i.e iden-
tification relies on restrictions explicitly derived from theory. This ensures consistency
of the identification of the VAR model with the implied structural form of the DSGE
model. Restrictions are formulated as sign restrictions. Thus, the DSGE model serves
as a way to summarize the ideas economists have about the economy. Ideally, it incor-
porates the assumptions the researcher wants to discriminate between, but in any case
it should be as agnostic as possible about the response of the variables of interest to
the shock of interest.
The DSGE model is estimated by matching the impulse response functions of the
VAR and of the DSGE, i.e. their implied dynamics. Therefore, it need not be a
representation of the data-generating process. While the shock of interest has to be
included, as well as other shocks necessary to distinguish it, the DSGE model need not
be fully stochastically specified.
The methodology has been first illustrated by means of a Monte Carlo experiment
and has been applied to the data afterwards. In the Monte Carlo experiment, artificial
data has been simulated from a simple fiscal theory of the price level model in which
fiscal policy is active and monetary policy passive. The sign of the response of inflation
to a monetary policy shock has been investigated. Depending on the policy regime,
i.e. the reaction coefficients of the policy rules, the response can either be negative or
positive. The prior distributions of the policy parameters have been chosen such as to
ensure that both regimes and therefore both responses are equally likely. The estimated
impulse response function of the VAR model as well as the posterior distribution of
the parameter of the DSGE model indicate that the methodology works correctly:
the response of inflation shows the ’true’ sign and the posterior distribution of the
parameter of the DSGE model consists solely of policy coefficients from active fiscal
and passive monetary policy.
Finally, the methodology has been used to estimate the response of inflation to a
monetary policy shock. As a DSGE model, the deep habits model laid out by Ravn
et al. (2008) has been employed. The posterior estimates of the parameters of the
DSGE model are similar or only slightly different from those obtained by the authors.
Correspondingly, I find a positive and on a 68% level significant response of inflation
to a monetary policy shock. However, while the mean of the impulse response function
of the VAR model is positive, the uncertainty bands indicate that a negative response
of inflation to a monetary policy is as likely as a positive one.
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Chapter 3
Pre-announcement and Timing –
The Effects of a Government
Expenditure Shock
This chapter investigates the effect of a government expenditure shock on consump-
tion and real wages. I identify the shock by exploiting its pre-announced nature, i.e.
different signs of the responses in investment, hours worked and output during the an-
nouncement and after the realization of the shock. Since pre-announcement leads to a
non-stationary moving average representation, I estimate and identify a VMA model.
The identifying restrictions are derived from a DSGE model, which is estimated by
matching the impulse response functions of the VMA model. Private consumption is
found to respond negatively during the announcement period and positively after the
realization. The reaction of real wages is significantly positive on impact, decreases
during the announcement horizon, and is again significantly positive for two quarters
after the realization.
3.1 Introduction
What are the effects of an innovation in government expenditure on the economy? It
still remains disputed whether private consumption and real wages rise or fall in re-
sponse. While economic theory supports both outcomes, empiricists have not yet been
able to discriminate between different explanations, as the literature is divided over
the appropriate methodological approach. On the one hand, the narrative approach
identifying changes in government spending by military buildup dates in the US, pre-
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dicts a decrease in consumption and real wages. On the other hand, the structural
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach identifying the shocks either with timing or
sign restriction, predicts the opposite.
In this chapter I investigate the effects of a government expenditure shock by em-
ploying an SVAR model approach and identifying it via sign restriction as in Mountford
and Uhlig (2005) and Pappa (2005). Moreover, I explicitly model pre-announcement
of the fiscal policy shock and its consequences: the behavior of investment, GDP and
hours worked differs during the announcement period and after the realization of the
shock1. By doing so, I first avoid both criticism of the narrative approach - the poten-
tial small sample problems, be it with one shock or a combination of many - and also
the ongoing discussion whether ‘abnormal’ fiscal policy episodes lead to ‘abnormal’ or
‘normal’ behavior of the economy.
Second, the approach set out in the paper also sidesteps the potential pitfalls of
the SVAR approach. In a recent paper, Ramey (2008) pointed out that the different
results obtained by using this approach are simply due to a faulty timing assumption
in the SVAR literature which neglects or misses that changes in the government budget
are often pre-announced or known to the public beforehand. One recent example is
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which announces government
expenditures from 1009 to 2012 with most spending taken place in 2010 and 2011.
As I will demonstrate in this paper, identifying the government expenditure shock by
exploiting the pre-announcement effects explicitly, i.e. considering qualitative differ-
ences in the response of investment during the pre-announcement period and after the
realization of the shock, overcomes the critique by Ramey.
When pursuing this approach another issue arises: the moving average representa-
tion of the data generated by a pre-announced policy is potentially non-stable so that
it cannot be approximated by a VAR model2. Non-stability of the moving average
representation has two consequences: First, the information set of the agent in the
economy is larger than the information set of the econometrician: the agent has news
about future, pre-announced changes, which are not contained in the information set
observed by the econometrician. This news is discounted by the agent in a different way
than by the econometrician. The econometrician estimates innovations as a discounted
sum of past news, where older news receives less weight than more recent. But, for
an agent yesterday’s news on pre-announced policy can be more relevant than today’s.
1The existence of those differences were found by House and Shapiro (2006) and Trabandt and
Uhlig (2006) among others.
2As pointed out first by Hansen and Sargent (1991) and more recently by Leeper et al. (2008).
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One challenge is therefore to align the information set of the econometrician with that
of the agent. In this paper I achieve this by using additional information taken from the
DSGE model. A second difficulty arises when attempting to estimate the non-stable
moving average process. One possibility, as laid out by Lippi and Reichlin (1993) and
Lippi and Reichlin (1994) is to flip the unstable roots of the moving average process
into a stable region via Blaschke factors. Another way to proceed is to estimate the
moving average process with a Kalman Filter3. In this paper I therefore estimate the
Vector moving average representation.
Since there exists no common knowledge about the behavior of the macroeconomic
variables, I formally derive the sign restrictions from a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model. As DSGE model, I employ a model laid out by Galí, López-
Salido, and Vallés (2007). It is well suited to resolving the debate because it addresses
the arguments why the classic results should hold as well as the typical arguments why
the classic results fail: households which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor
markets and a certain degree of price stickiness. Depending on its parametrization, for
example the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers and the degree of price stickiness, the
model features several classic or Keynesian characteristics. In the limit, i.e. with no
rule-of-thumb consumers and firms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down
to a neoclassical model. To what extend those components influence the variables of
interest and the resulting sign restrictions for the VMA model depends on a small
number of structural parameters. The parameters of the DSGE model are estimated
jointly.
The results for a three-quarter pre-announced increase in government expenditures
show strong qualitative differences during the announcement period and after the real-
ization of the shock: output and hours worked respond negatively during the announce-
ment period and positively afterwards; investment responds negatively one additional
quarter before responding positively. Private consumption mimics this behavior and
shows a stable, slightly negative response during the announcement period followed
by a significant positive response after the realization of the shock. Real wages re-
act significantly positively on impact, decrease (and even become negative) during
the announcement horizon and react significantly positively for two quarters after the
realization.
The chapter is organized in the following way: the next section summarizes the
related literature. In section 3.3 I lay out the econometric strategy. The DSGE model
3This is shown by Eric Leeper on slides available on his webpage. Appendix B.3 summarizes his
insights to keep the paper self-explanatory.
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used to derive the sign restriction is described in section 3.4. The results are summa-
rized in section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
In this section I first shortly review the theoretical work on the effects of a government
expenditure shock before I discuss the existing empirical approaches and findings in
more detail.
The evolution of the literature on the effects of a government expenditure shock can
be summarized in the following way: starting out from a neoclassic growth model, which
is step by step extended with market imperfections and nominal rigidities, an ultra New
Keynesian model (as Ramey called it) evolved. The first neoclassic attempts to study
the effects of fiscal policy date back to Hall (1980) and Barro (Barro (1981) and Barro
(1987)). Building upon this work, Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1990) and
Baxter and King (1993) expand a neoclassical growth model of a government sector. In
these models, an increase in government expenditure creates a negative wealth effect for
the household, which will reduce consumption and increase labor supply. The increased
labor supply induces real wages to decrease and interest rates to increase.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) intro-
duced market imperfections, increasing returns to scale as well as monopolistic and
oligopolistic competition respectively into the neoclassic growth model. In their mod-
els, a government spending shock, or a general demand shock, increases demand for
goods, thereby labor demand and thus real wages. In a recent paper, Galí et al. (2007)
extend the New Keynesian model with rule-of-thumb consumers, who neither borrow
nor save, only consume the disposable income each period. Since those households do
not feel intertemporally poorer, they do not decrease consumption as a response to a
positive government expenditure shock. Confronted with this large number of compet-
ing models, empiricists have tried to discriminate between them by investigating the
response of real wages and private consumption after a change in government spending.
Findings in existing empirical studies are twofold depending on the identification
scheme of the government expenditure shock. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use a nar-
rative approach to identify the VAR model. They interpret times of large military
buildups in the US, the Korean war, the Vietnam war and the Carter-Reagan buildup,
as sudden and unforseen increases in government expenditure. The resulting reactions
of macroeconomic variables to these events are thus interpreted as deviations from
normal behavior. They find that output and hours rise, while consumption and real
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wages fall. Burnside et al. (2004) employ a similar methodology to estimate the im-
pulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a government expenditure shock and
compare them to impulse responses implied by a standard neoclassic model. The re-
sults indicate that hours worked rise and investment briefly increases, while real wages
and consumption decrease. Thus they conclude that the standard neoclassic model can
account reasonably well for the effects of fiscal policy shocks. A similar conclusion is
drawn by Edelberg et al. (1999), who modify a neoclassic growth model distinguishing
two types of capital, nonresidential and residential.
A structural VAR approach is chosen by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) to identify
a government expenditure shock. They require fiscal policy variables not to respond
immediately to other innovations in the economy, i.e. they employ the recursiveness
assumption. Their findings corroborate the results of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) con-
cerning output and hours worked, but contradict their findings for consumption and
real wages. Mountford and Uhlig (2005) also use a structural VAR, but do not consider
any timing restriction. Instead, they employ sign restrictions to restrict the responses
of fiscal variables, while the responses of other macroeconomic variables are left open.
Besides the different methodology, they additionally allow for a pre-announcement of
fiscal policy shocks. Indeed, as has been widely acknowledged and mentioned, most
fiscal policy shocks are pre-announced. Their findings, however, confirm the results
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) except for consumption, which only shows a weak
positive response.
The debate about the empirical evidence was reopened by Ramey (2008)4. Her
paper takes up two issues. First, she stresses the importance of the composition of
government expenditures. The dataset used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) includes
government consumption as well as government investment expenditure. An increase
in the latter can be productive and potentially complement private consumption and
investment so that it might lead to a positive response in those variables. For these
reasons Ramey advocates using defense spending as a proxy for government expen-
ditures in the VAR. Second, she states that the findings of the studies differ due to
pre-announcement effects, implying that Blanchard and Perotti (2002) employ faulty
timing to identify the fiscal policy shock. In her paper, a neoclassic DSGE model
including a pre-announced government expenditure shock is set up and used to sim-
ulate artificial data. It is then demonstrated that, if the pre-announcement of the
shock is taken into account, a negative response in consumption is estimated. If not,
consumption appears to react positively, a clearly misleading result.
4The first version dates back to 2006.
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In his summary and discussion of the recent literature, Perotti (2007) acknowledges
the concerns with respect to the structural VAR methodology. As a possible way of
overcoming its weaknesses he suggests employing annual data and distinguishing be-
tween shocks to defense spending and to civilian government spending. However, using
annual data, the recursive assumption that the fiscal sector does not react contemporar-
ily to the state of the economy might not hold anymore. But, as Perotti mentions, the
narrative approach has considerable weaknesses of its own: First, it suffers from a small
sample size, second, it is not entirely clear whether the whole change in government
expenditure was announced at once or whether it was a combination of small changes,
i.e. whether there were numerous revisions of the military budget, occurring one after
the other, causing private consumption to respond multiple times.
In Ravn et al. (2007), the authors dismiss Ramey’s critique of the usage of struc-
tural VAR models. They point out that shocks are by assumption orthogonal to the
information set and consequently identify a structural VAR as in Blanchard and Perotti
(2002).
Pre-announced fiscal policy is considered in Mertens and Ravn (2009) and Tenhofen
and Wolff (2007). The former authors address the issue of non-invertibility of the mov-
ing average representation by using a Vector Error Correction Model. The government
expenditure shock is then identified by a combination of long run and zero restrictions.
The latter authors augment the original VAR model by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
with expectations and consider a one period pre-announcement only. This paper differs
in two dimensions: first by using sign restriction to identify the government expendi-
ture, putting less structure and fewer restrictions on the VAR model, and second by
estimating a VMA model to circumvent the issue of non-invertibility.
Besides the problem of non-invertibility of the moving average representation,
Chung and Leeper (2007) discuss the importance of the intertemporal government
budget constraint for a structural VAR analysis. In order to estimate reduced form
shocks that can be mapped into structural innovations, government debt and private
investment should be included in a VAR model.
Another important issue to take into account, as pointed out by Ramey (2008),
is the composition of government expenditure and what part is used in the estima-
tion. Abstracting from government transfers, government expenditure is defined as
the sum of government investment expenditure and government consumption expendi-
ture. Both types have different implications for the variables of interest. As described
in Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), an increase in government investment expenditure
increases productivity and therefore private consumption and real wages. Including
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government investment expenditure in the analysis would therefore favor a Keynesian
outcome, i.e. an increase in both variables of interest and an adulteration of the anal-
ysis. Furthermore, government consumption expenditure is quantitatively much more
relevant (since the 1970s it has been about five times as large as government invest-
ment expenditure). I will therefore employ government consumption expenditure when
estimating the effects of an innovation in government expenditure.
3.3 Econometric Strategy
Before describing the estimation methodology in detail, I will discuss one note of cau-
tion when estimating fiscal policy set out by Leeper et al. (2008). They discuss the
problem that private agents have foresight about future fiscal policy, which the inves-
tigating econometrician does not have, i.e. the information set of the private agent is
larger than the information set of the econometrician. This leads to the effect, that
agents discount news differently compared to the econometrician. More precisely, the
econometrician estimates innovations as a discounted sum of old news where former
news receives less weight. For the agent former news has a larger effect on today’s vari-
ables due to pre-announcement. Secondly, they show that whenever foresight about
future fiscal variables is present the resulting moving average representation of the data
exhibits roots inside the unit circle. Consequently, the moving average process is not
invertible and cannot be approximated by a VAR model. Furthermore, estimation of
a moving average process with this kind of long memory property proves to be very
difficult.
There exist two possibilities to address the latter issue: flipping the roots of the
moving average process outside the unit circle by either applying a Blaschke-factor or
a Kalman Filter.5 I will employ the latter and thus obtain correct estimates of the
reduced form moving average coefficients6. In order to recover the information set of
the private agent I will apply sign restrictions.
These restrictions are derived from impulse response functions of the DSGE model.
Two issues become crucial: the choice of the DSGE model and its parametrization. As
DSGE model I employ a model laid out by Galí et al. (2007). It is well suited to navi-
gating through the debate because it addresses the arguments why the classic results
should hold as well as the typical arguments why the classic results fail: households
5Leeper et al. (2008) discuss both possibilities extensively. Blaschke factors are used by Mertens
and Ravn (2009).
6More algebraic details are given in appendix B.3.
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which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor markets and a certain degree of
price stickiness. Depending on its parametrization, for example the fraction of rule-of-
thumb consumers and the degree of price stickiness, the model features several classic
or Keynesian characteristics. In the limit, i.e. with no rule-of-thumb consumers and
firms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down to a neoclassical model. There-
fore, as Figure B.3 indicates, this DSGE model allows for positive as well as negative
responses in consumption and real wages. To what extend these components influence
the variables of interest and the resulting sign restrictions for the VMA model depends
on a small number of structural parameters, which have to be estimated.
The estimation methodology for the structural parameters of the DSGE model is
chosen on the following grounds: due to advances in computational power there are
various ways to estimate a DSGE model nowadays. However, procedures and results
differ substantially depending on the econometric interpretation of the DSGE model.
Geweke (1999a) distinguishes between a strong and a weak interpretation. The former
requires the DSGE model to provide a full description of the data generating process.
Formally, it has to exhibit as many structural shocks as the observable variables to be
explained. The DSGE model described above is clearly not intended to be a proper
representation of the data generating process7. One estimation strategy therefore is to
extend the DSGE model with additional structural shocks and several additional fea-
tures and frictions such as for example capacity utilization and a habit in consumption.
This is no such thing as a free lunch. This comes at the cost of a diluted analysis. The
result cannot be traced back to certain DSGE model components such as for example
the share of rule-of-thumb households and the degree of price stickiness, whose effects
are to be investigated. Attempting to apply the strong econometric interpretation to
DSGE model without extensions results in biased estimation results.8 I therefore follow
the weak econometric interpretation of the DSGE model and do not assume that it
is a proper representation of the data generating process. Instead, the DSGE model
is estimated by matching the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and a
VMA model to a government expenditure shock by the methodology laid out in detail
in chapter 2.
Thus, on the one hand the parameters of the DSGE model are estimated by match-
ing the corresponding impulse response functions of the VMA model. On the other
hand, the structural impulse response functions of the VMA model are identified by
applying sign restrictions which are derived from the DSGE model. Both distributions
7As is pointed out by Galí et al. (2007).
8In that case it is not possible to identify all structural parameters.
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are therefore conditional distributions: they depend on a realization of the impulse
response function of the VMA model and on restrictions from the DSGE model, i.e. a
realization of a vector of structural parameters of the DSGE model and a realization
of the coefficients of the VMA model, respectively. To take those dependencies into
account it is necessary to consider both, the impulse response functions of the VMA
model and of the DSGE model as stochastic and to characterize their joint distribution.
There is one aspect, in which the application of the methodology differs from chapter
2. In chapter 2 the VMA model was approximated by a VAR model. In this chapter
I estimate the VMA model. This yields a slightly modified estimation of the time
series model as well as a modified sampling algorithm. Both are described in detail in
Appendix B.2.2 and B.2.3.
3.4 The DSGE model
The DSGE model employed here was originally laid out by Galí et al. (2007). I relax the
assumption of no initial debt in order to contrast the DSGE model with the data. The
DSGE model consists of two types of households, households with access to government
bond and capital markets and households without. Goods are produced by perfectly
competitive firms, using goods produced by intermediate firms as inputs. Intermediate
good firms are monopolistic competitors and subject to a Calvo pricing mechanism,
i.e. with a certain probability they receive a signal allowing them to reset their price
which they are not allowed to change otherwise. Intermediate good firms have access
to a production technology combining capital and labor. Labor is supplied by labor
unions.
The government consists of a monetary authority setting the nominal interest rate
and a fiscal authority issuing bonds and raising taxes. Government expenditure is
modeled as an exogenous process.
The DSGE model exhibits a continuum of infinitively lived households indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. There exist two types of households, households optimizing intertemporally
and households which are not allowed to save. The latter are called rule-of-thumb
households. More precisely, they are not allowed to participate in the capital and
bonds goods market, an assumption made to reflect the fact that some households
have indeed only limited access to the credit market. The share of rule-of-thumb
households in the economy is given by λ.
Intertemporally optimizing households maximize utility depending on consumption
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where β is the discount factor and ν a parameter measuring the disutility of labor. The
household buys government bonds B yielding the return R, invest io units in capital
goods ko yielding return Rk and receives dividends d from the ownership of firms. With
real wages denoted by w and lump sum taxes by to the budget constraint is given by:
cot + iot +
Bt
ptRbt
= wtnot +Rkt kot−1 +
Bt−1
pt
+ tot + dt. (3.2)
Capital accumulates according to:






where Φ denotes investment to capital adjustment costs. With respect to the adjust-
ment cost function the following assumptions are made: Φ(δ) = δ, Φ′(δ) = 1, Φ′ > 0,








) is defined as: η ≡ − 1Φ′′(δ)δ .
Rule-of-thumb households maximize each period’s utility:
U = log(crt )−
nrt
1+ν
1 + ν (3.4)
subject to the budget constraint:
crt = wtnrt − trt (3.5)
Both types of households are assumed to consume the same amount of goods in the
steady state. This can be achieved through the appropriate choices of the lump sum
taxes tr and to. Aggregate variables, i.e. aggregate consumption c, labor n, capital k
and investment i are defined as the weighted average of the corresponding variables of
the rule-of-thumb household and the intertemporally optimizing household:
ct = λcrt + (1− λ)cot (3.6)
nt = λnrt + (1− λ)not (3.7)
it = (1− λ)iot (3.8)
kt = (1− λ)kot . (3.9)
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3.4.1 Firms
The economy contains two sectors. In one sector perfectly competitive firms produce
the final good y using as inputs intermediate goods produced by monopolistically com-
petitive firms.
3.4.1.1 Final good firms










where y(j) denotes the intermediate good produced by firm j and $p > 1 the elasticity

















3.4.1.2 Intermediate good firms
An intermediate good firm j, j ∈ [0, 1] produces the good y(j) using the production
function:
yt(j) = kt−1(j)αnt(j)1−α, (3.13)
where α denotes the capital share in the production. Taking the real wage and capital












Real marginal costs MC common to all firms can be derived as
MCt = α−α(1− α)−(1−α)Rkt
α
w1−αt . (3.15)
Intermediate good firms are subject to a Calvo pricing mechanism. Each period the
firm receives a price signal with probability ϑ. The intermediate firm is allowed to set
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The government sector consists of a monetary authority setting nominal interest rates
R and a fiscal authority setting lump sum taxes t and issuing nominal government
bonds B. The monetary authority follows the simple interest rate rule:
Rt = φpiπt. (3.18)








Since the fiscal authority can adjust bonds and lump sum taxes, an additional fiscal











As an additional friction, an imperfect labor market is assumed. The introduction of
wage-setting by unions leads to the outcome that the amount of labor supplied by the
households is equal across households, i.e. not = nrt . A continuum of unions is assumed
representing a certain type of labor. Let $w denote the elasticity of substitution across








9x̄ denote steady state values.
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Assuming furthermore that the proportion of rule-of-thumb households is uniformly
distributed across households and therefore across unions, a typical union (z) sets the

























3.4.4 Market clearing and equilibrium
The goods market clearing condition is given by:
yt = ct + it + gt. (3.24)
An equilibrium is defined in the following way:
Definition 2 An equilibrium is an allocation {ct, nt, it, kt, bt, yt} and a price system
{pt(j), pt, wt(z), wt, Rkt , Rbt} and an inflation rate πt such that for a monetary policy Rt
and fiscal policy tt, an initial price level p−1, initial values for k−1 and b−1 and given
an exogenous processes for government expenditure {gt}:
i for each intertemporally maximizing household an allocation {cot , not , kot , xot} maxi-
mizes (3.1) subject to the budget constraint (3.2) and the capital accumulation
equation (3.3), given prices {wt, Rkt , Rbt} and profits {dt};
ii for each rule-of-thumb household an allocation {crt , nrt} maximizes (3.4) subject to
the budget constraint (3.5), given prices {wt};
iii the definitions
ct = λcrt + (1− λ)cot (3.25)
nt = λnrt + (1− λ)not (3.26)
it = (1− λ)iot (3.27)
kt = (1− λ)kot (3.28)
hold;
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iv the production allocation {yt(j), yt} and prices {pt, pt(j), Rkt , wt} solve the cost min-
imization problem of the final good firms and the profit maximization problem of
each intermediate firm j subject to the demand function (3.17) and technology
(3.13);
v for each labor union z the allocation {nt, nt(z), crt (z), cot (z)} and prices {wt(z), wt}
maximize the pay-off function (3.22) subject to the demand for each labor union
(3.23);
vi the government budget constraint (3.19) is fulfilled;
vii markets are clear.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Pre-announcement and timing – A Monte Carlo Study
In this section the DSGE model is calibrated to mimic the DSGE model employed by
Ramey (2008). I simulate artificial data from it and estimate a structural VAR model
with this dataset taking pre-announcement effects into account.
In order to mimic the DSGEmodel laid out by Ramey, which is a neoclassical growth
model with government spending and non-distortionary taxes, the DSGE model from
section 3.4 is calibrated in the following way. The fraction of rule-of-thumb households
is set to 0 (λ = 0), the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio with respect to
Tobin’s q is set fairly high (η = 10), the probability of not optimizing prices is set
very low to mirror almost flexible prices (ϑ = 0.05) and the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods is set to 1 (µp = 1). Remaining parameters are chosen
similar to Ramey, i.e. the discount factor β = 0.99, the depreciation rate δ = 0.025,
the capital share in production α = 0.33 and the parameter measuring the disutility of
labor ν = 1. The policy parameters of the fiscal and monetary authorities are set such
as to ensure uniqueness of the solution: φb = 0.3, φg = 0.1 and φπ = 1.5. The processes
for actual government expenditures gt and the forecast of government expenditure gft
are taken from Ramey:
ĝt = ĝft−2 (3.29)
ĝft = 1.4ĝft−1 − 0.18ĝft−2 − 0.25ĝft−3 + εgt (3.30)
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Since I am going to estimate a VAR model with four variables, the DSGE model
from which the data is simulated has to incorporate at least this number of shocks. I
therefore augment the model with a preference shock to labor, a shock to total factor
productivity (as Ramey does) and a monetary policy shock (i.e. a shock to equation
(3.18)).
The resulting impulse response function of the DSGE model to a shock in govern-
ment expenditure is plotted in Figure B.1. It is very similar to the figure in Ramey
(2008). Note that investment first reacts positively to the shock and becomes negative
afterwards. In order to provide evidence that making use of the pre-announced nature
of a government expenditure shock, i.e. restricting variables to respond differently dur-
ing the announcement of the shock and after realization ,can resolve the problem of
flawed estimation approaches, I identify the government expenditure shock employing
the following sign restrictions: government expenditure are assumed to be zero during
the first period (pre-announcement period) and to be positive afterwards, hours worked
are assumed to respond positively and investment is restricted to respond positively
during the first quarter and to respond negatively afterwards.10
The result of the Monte Carlo Experiment is shown in Figure B.2. The response of
consumption is significantly negative. This finding is robust with respect to a faulty
pre-announced period (one only instead of two) and whether the government expen-
diture shock is ordered first or second. Given this encouraging result I will apply the
methodology to the data. This time, however, the sign restrictions will not be identical
across the parameter space of the DSGE model.
3.5.2 Data
I now apply the methodology to quarterly US data ranging from the first quarter of
1948 to the third of 2007. The VMA model consists of seven variables: government
consumption expenditure, real GDP, private consumption, hours worked, private in-
vestment, real wages and real federal debt. The data was obtained from the internet,
mostly from NIPA and FRED. In appendix B.1 a detailed description of the exact
source can be found. In order to remove long term trends from the data I employ a
HP filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 1600.11
10Note that I do not describe the joint distribution of the impulse response function of the DSGE
model and the VAR model. This is due to the fact that the sign restrictions are identical across a
reasonable parameter space of the DSGE model.
11As suggested by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).
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3.5.3 Specification of the identifying restriction and the prior
distribution
I order the government expenditure shock similarly as in Mountford and Uhlig (2005)
to come second after a business cycle shock; output, real wages, private investment,
private consumption and hours worked are restricted to respond positively. By doing
so the business cycle shock is assumed to explain most of the variance of the variables
of the VMA model. The government expenditure shock is constructed to be orthogonal
to the business cycle shock, i.e. most of the potential co-movements will be removed.
The pre-announcement horizon is set to three quarters following the number suggested
by Yang (2007). All variables except private consumption and real wages are restricted
to exhibit the signs derived from the impulse response function of the DSGE model.
The sign is allowed to switch, i.e. it can differ during the pre-announcement of the
shock and after its realization.
The mean of the prior distributions of the parameters of the DSGEmodel is specified
very closely to values used for calibration by Galí et al. (2007). One exception is the
choice of η. In order to allow for a wider range of impulse responses, the mean is set
to 7. The standard deviations of the prior distribution are chosen to ensure that the
impulse response functions of the DSGE model cover a wide range of possibilities as
depicted in Figure B.3. Not all parameters are estimated. The values used to calibrate
those parameters are taken entirely from Galí et al. (2007), except for the ratio of
real debt to GDP which is set to b̄
ȳ
= 0.6. Calibrated parameters include: β = 0.99,
δ = 0.025, α = 1/3, ḡ
y
= 0.2, φπ = 1.5 and µπ = 1.2.
3.5.4 Estimation Results
The smoothed Kalman filter maximum likelihood estimates of the VMA model vari-
ables are depicted in Figure B.4. The plot indicates that the time series is very well
described by the VMA model.
The impulse response functions of the VMA model are shown in Figure B.5. The
first subplot displays the announcement and the realization of the government con-
sumption expenditure shock: the first three periods are restricted to zero followed by
one positive period. Afterwards, government expenditures fall and even become nega-
tive. Given the fact that real debt responds positively over five quarters (even though
the response is restricted for four quarters only), the decline in government expendi-
ture gives rise to a policy rule in which government consumption expenditure reacts
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negatively on an increase in real debt - as suggested among others by Leeper and Yang
(2008), Bohn (1991) and Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2009).
The responses of output and hours worked in Figure B.5 display a significantly
different qualitative behavior before and after the realization of the government con-
sumption expenditure shock. Both react negatively during the announcement horizon
and strongly positively after the realization of the shock. The response of private in-
vestment shows similar behavior, but the sign of the response changes after four (not
after the announcement horizon of three quarters) from negative to positive. This im-
plies that the restrictions derived from the DSGE model are negative over the complete
restriction horizon.
Summarizing the estimated sign restrictions from the DSGE model, it can be stated
that real debt is restricted to react positively over four periods, private investment to
react negatively, while output and hours worked are restricted to respond negatively
during the announcement period and positively after the realization.
These identifying restrictions imply the following results for private consumption
and real wages. Private consumption displays significantly negative behavior through-
out the announcement period and a very strong positive response afterwards. Real
wages react significantly positively on impact, decrease throughout the announcement
period and increase after the realization. During the fifth and sixth period the response
of real wages is positive.
What is driving this result? One advantage of the methodology employed is that
the estimated impulse response functions of the VMA model can be interpreted in
economic terms by means of the DSGE model. Key for the interpretation are the
estimation results of the structural parameters of the DSGE model. Before I interpret
the results, I present and discuss the estimation results of the structural parameters
and the corresponding impulse response function of the DSGE model.
The prior and posterior distribution is plotted in Figure B.7. Table B.1 gives an
overview of the characteristics of the prior and posterior distribution. The plot and the
table indicate that all parameters are well identified and that the estimates are within
a very reasonable range. The estimated share of rule-of-thumb consumers (0.36 at the
posterior mean) is in the range of the estimates obtained by Forni, Monteforte, and
Sessa (2009) in studies using European data: 0.34 − 0.37. The posterior mean of the
calvo parameter (ϑ = 0.74) is estimated slightly higher than in a recent study by Smets
and Wouters (2007), who estimated it at about (ϑ = 0.66). However, the relatively
high estimate of the price stickiness parameter is consistent with a characteristic of the
DSGE model pointed out by Furlanetto and Seneca (2009): the DSGE model employed
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obeys many real frictions, which are present in the DSGE model of Smets and Wouters
(2007). Once those real rigidities were included, the resulting nominal frictions would
have been estimated at lower values. The posterior mean estimate of the elasticity of
labor with respect to wages (ν = 0.14) is in line with, though slightly lower than the
estimates obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999). The value for the estimate of the elasticity of the investment to capital-capital
ratio with respect to Tobins‘s Q (η = 4.2) is higher than the value calibrated by Galí
et al. (2007) (η = 1), implying less investment adjustment costs. Given the response
of government expenditure in Figure B.5, the persistence of government expenditure
(ρg = 0.74) is lower than that calibrated by Galí et al. (2007) (ρg = 0.9). The elasticity
of taxes with respect to government expenditure (φg = 0.08) and the elasticity of taxes
with respect to government debt (φb = 0.32) are closely estimated to the values set by
Galí et al. (2007) ((φg = 0.1) and φ=0.33).
A comparison of the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and the VMA
model is plotted in Figure B.6. The impulse response functions of the VMA model are
well matched by those of the DSGE model. In particular, the movement of output,
hours worked, private consumption, and real wages (for some periods) are very well
matched by the DSGE model. Impulse response functions not matched very well
include private investment, government consumption expenditure and real debt after
they become negative.
The impulse response of government consumption expenditure of the VMA model is
very well matched by the DSGE model up to the point where government consumption
expenditure becomes negative. Since the DSGE model employed in this analysis does
not feature a policy rule with spending reversals, the behavior of government consump-
tion expenditure after the shock cannot be matched by the impulse response function
of the DSGE model. A policy rule featuring government spending reversals would be
straightforward to implement. On the other hand, a modified policy rule would also
affect other endogenous variables differently compared to the original DSGE model I
want to consider. In order to be as transparent as possible on the choice of the DSGE
model and its consequences, I choose to abstain from modifying the DSGE model in
any dimension. A similar reasoning, i.e. a lack in the richness of the specification of
the fiscal policy rules, applies to the response of real debt. Initially, the DSGE model
has a lower response of real debt, which increases over time, while the impulse response
function of the VMA model displays a strong initial positive response, which becomes
negative after five periods.
The impulse response of private investment displays the largest difference between
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the VMA model and the DSGE model: the VMA model displays a strong negative
response, which becomes positive after the restriction horizon of four periods. Even
though, the adjustment costs of inflation are estimated more flexibly than in the original
calibration by Galí et al. (2007), the response of investment is less volatile in the DSGE
model than in the VMA model.
Most importantly, the impulse response functions of the DSGE model and the VMA
model, which are at the center of the analysis, correspond very well: firstly the variables
which display a qualitative difference between the announcement and the realization of
the shock, i.e. output and hours worked; and secondly the variables under inspection,
private consumption over the complete horizon and real wages except for the first
period. Since the impulse responses correspond so well, the DSGE model can be used
to recover the mechanism behind the impulse responses of private consumption and real
wages. Key for the mechanism are the expectations formed by the firm sector. Figure
B.8 shows the impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate and inflation in
the DSGE model. Both responses rise after the pre-announcement of the shock. Firms
anticipate higher inflation after the realization of the shock and increase prices after
the announcement immediately. Monetary authorities increase nominal interest rates
as a response to the rise in inflation. The increase in prices leads to an initial drop
in GDP, hours worked, private consumption and investment. The result is stagflation
during the announcement. The increase in government expenditure leads then to a rise
in output, hours worked and private consumption for two reasons: a rise in income for
the share of rule-of-thumb households and a drop in prices due to the negative response
of output so far - prices overshoot.
3.5.5 Fiscal Multiplier and Variance decomposition
I compute two kinds of fiscal multipliers. The first multiplier is defined as the ratio of
the response of output divided by the change in government expenditure and scaled by
the average share of government consumption expenditure in GDP over the sample12.
The result is shown in Figure B.9. Due to the negative response of output after the
announcement, the fiscal multiplier is negative. After two periods it is strongly rising,
becomes positive after four periods and significantly larger than 1 after five periods.
Eventually it is decreasing again.
The second multiplier is defined as the cumulative change in output divided by
the change in government consumption expenditure and scaled by the average share of
12This definition is also used in Mountford and Uhlig (2008).
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government consumption expenditure in GDP over the sample. The result is depicted
in Figure B.10. The negative response of output in the beginning causes the multiplier
to not be positive until five periods after the announcement.
The share of the variance of the variables explained by the two shocks is shown in
Figure B.11 and Figure B.12 for the business cycle and the government consumption
expenditure shock respectively. As assumed, the business cycle shock explains most of
the variance in all variables. For all variables except government expenditure this is
up to 40% with a median around 10%. The government expenditure shock explains up
to 10% of the variance during the announcement period for the variables except real
wages. Here up to 40% is explained during the impact period, but much less, below
15%, in the following periods. After the realization of the shock, up to 20% of the
variance in output and private consumption is explained.
3.5.6 Comparison with other studies
To the best of my knowledge there are three studies considering the effects of a pre-
announced government expenditure shock using a SVAR model approach.
The results presented in this paper are most similar to those obtained by Mertens
and Ravn (2009). In contrast to the other studies they also address the issue of the
non-invertibility of the VMA representation. Even though they do not find qualitative
differences in the response of private consumption and output after the announcement
and the realization of a shock, they find a very strong announcement effect: both
variables increase strongly when the shock takes place. During the announcement
private consumption reacts negatively.
The results obtained are also in line with Tenhofen and Wolff (2007). They con-
sider a one quarter announcement horizon and find a negative response of private
consumption to a pre-announced government expenditure shock. After the shock, pri-
vate consumption increases steadily, but, in contrast to the result in this paper, does
not become positive.
Mountford and Uhlig (2008) consider different policy scenarios for a four quarter
announcement horizon without explicitly modeling the pre-announcement. For an
announced increase in government expenditure they find an immediate rise in private
consumption and output as the effect of the announcement. Despite a more persistent
response in output and private consumption they do not find any other announcement
effects.
Putting the results into the context of the debate between Ramey (2008) and Blan-
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chard and Perotti (2002), I find partial support for both views: while there are pre-
announcement effects that cause private consumption to respond negatively during the
first periods as pointed out by Ramey (2008), the realization of the shock leads to a
strong positive response in private consumption as found by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002).
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effect of a government expenditure shock on private
consumption and real wages by employing a structural VMA model. The identification
key has been to model the pre-announcement of a government expenditure shock and
its consequences on other economic variables explicitly.
The application of this idea is not straightforward for two reasons: first, when as-
suming that policy is pre-announced, the moving average representation of the data
generated by this policy is potentially non-stable so that it cannot be approximated
by a VAR model. I have therefore estimated a VMA model directly. Second, since
the restrictions are not common knowledge I have employed a DSGE model, laid out
initially by Galí et al. (2007), from which to derive the sign restrictions. The DSGE
model is well suited to the problem because it addresses the typical arguments of the
Keynesian as well as the classic view of the economy. On the one hand it features
households which cannot smooth consumption, imperfect labor markets and a certain
degree of price stickiness. How strong these features influence the result and the re-
strictions depend on its parametrization, for example the proportion of rule-of-thumb
consumers and the degree of price stickiness. In the limit, i.e. with no rule-of-thumb
consumers and firms allowed to reset prices each period, it boils down to a neoclas-
sical model. Therefore, as Figure B.3, indicates this DSGE model allows for positive
as well as negative responses in consumption and real wages. The parametrization of
the DSGE model and the corresponding identifying assumptions for the VMA model
are estimated by matching the corresponding impulse response functions of the VMA
model. Thus the parameters of the VMA model and the DSGE model are estimated
jointly.
The results for a three quarter pre-announced increase in government expendi-
tures show strong qualitative differences during the announcement period and after
the realization of the shock: output and hours worked respond negatively during the
announcement period and positively afterwards, investment responds negatively one
additional quarter before responding positively. Private consumption mimics this be-
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havior and shows a stable, slightly negative response during the announcement period
followed by a significant positive response after the realization of the shock. Real wages
react significantly positively on impact, decrease (and even become negative) during
the announcement horizon and react significantly positively for two quarters after the
realization.
Chapter 4
Optimal Policy under Model
Uncertainty: A Structural-Bayesian
Estimation Approach
Uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models is a central concern
for optimal policy when policy prescriptions from those models differ. The standard
procedure is to specify a prior over the parameter space ignoring the special status
of some sub-models, e.g. those resulting from zero restrictions. This is especially
problematic if a model’s generalization could be either true progress or the latest fad
found to fit the data. We propose a procedure that ensures that the specified set of sub-
models is not discarded too easily and thus receives no weight in determining optimal
policy. We find that optimal policy based on our procedure leads to substantial welfare
gains compared to the standard practice.
4.1 Introduction
Recently, the empirical evaluation of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models employing Bayesian methods has made substantial progress 1. Policymakers
nowadays correspondingly employ relatively large estimated DSGE models, including
various features and frictions, in their policy analysis more and more. This practice is
based on the implicit idea that by capturing many aspects of the economy in one single
model, policy prescriptions derived from this model should guard against the risks of
1(Smets and Wouters, 2003, 2007; An and Schorfheide, 2007; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004).
67
68 CHAPTER 4
an uncertain economic environment.2 However, as it ignores the special status of sub-
models that are defined by zero restrictions, the recent practice is prone to uncertainty
about the appropriate choice of nested models. We show that this source of uncertainty
is a central concern for optimal policy and propose a procedure that insures against it
by assigning a non-zero weight to the set of sub-models.
To fix ideas, consider the following situation. After some process of theorizing and
data analysis, a policymaker has arrived at a baseline model, Model A. One day, a
researcher proposes to extend this model by adding a new feature or friction, replacing
it with Model B, in which Model A is nested. At a first glance, this seems to be a
win-win situation because the new model nests all the advantages of Model A and
moreover may improve the understanding of the economy and lead the policymaker to
make better policy decisions. However, the gain in explanatory power may be relatively
small, i.e. the posterior odds may not indicate substantial evidence against Model
A. Discarding Model A is further problematic because instead of true improvement,
Model B may be just the latest fad found to fit the data. When Model B introduces a
conflicting stabilization aim into the decision about policy, optimal policy prescriptions
from the two models differ. In this situation, the policymaker risks welfare losses by
ignoring Model A and putting all her eggs in one basket. In this chapter, we develop an
approach that takes into account both Models A and B to determine optimal policy.
Starting with a baseline model, we subsequently estimate a set of competing and
nested models. This bottom-up approach puts us into a position to separately evaluate
the gain in explanatory power of each extension. Optimal policy is then computed by
weighting each model with its posterior probability. Weighting over the set of nested
models allows the policymaker to make reasonable extensions of the baseline model but
also insure against the pitfalls of only employing one potentially misspecified model.
Using Euro-13 area data, we illustrate our approach to deal with model uncertainty
in nested models by choosing as a baseline model one of the most popular models
employed in monetary analysis nowadays: a standard cashless New Keynesian economy
with staggered price-setting without indexation (Woodford, 2003a). As examples of
uncertainty linked to the choice between nested models, we subsequently allow for more
lags in endogenous variables (indexation and habit formation) and omitted variables
(money). To represent the standard practice, we also consider one model that nests all
these features. While the predominant principle of optimal policy in cashless models
is price stability, a demand for money introduces a conflicting policy aim, namely
2Exemplary papers that fall in this category are Levin et al. (2005), Christiano, Trabandt, and
Walentin (2007), and more recently Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Svensson (2008).
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the stabilization of the nominal interest rate. In this environment, we find that our
procedure leads to welfare gains of approximately 70 percent compared to the standard
practice.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we intro-
duce our approach to analyze the optimal conduct of policy under model uncertainty.
In Section 4.3 we describe the baseline model and its extensions. In Section 4.4 we
present our estimation results and its consequences for optimal monetary policy. The
last section concludes.
4.2 Analyzing optimal policy under model uncer-
tainty
In this section, after a short description of the general setup we present two approaches
to cope with model uncertainty and describe how we assess the policy performance
under model uncertainty. The first approach is set to represent the standard practice:
without paying special attention to the set of sub-models, the policymaker determines
optimal policy by maximizing households’ utility within one single model that nests all
features and frictions. The second approach takes uncertainty about the appropriate
choice of nested models into account and weights over the set of nested models to derive
optimal policy prescriptions.
4.2.1 General setup
Consider a system of linear equations that represent log-linear approximations to the
non-linear equilibrium conditions under rational expectations around a deterministic
steady state of a particular Model i. Let xt be the vector of state variables, zt the
vector of structural shocks and yt the vector of observable variables. Furthermore, let
Θi denote the random vector of deep parameters and θi a particular realization from
the joint posterior distribution in Model i. Policy influences the equilibrium outcome
through simple feedback rules. The link between the set of policy instruments as a
subset of x is characterized by the vector of constant policy coefficients φ, i.e. by
definition we consider steady state invariant policies.3 The state space form of the
3A steady state-invariant policy is a policy which affects the dynamic evolution of the endogenous
variables around a steady state, but not the steady state itself.
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solution of model i is given by4:
x̂t = T (θi, φ)x̂t−1 +R(θi, φ)zt (4.1)
ŷt = Gx̂t, (4.2)
where T (θi, φ) and R(θi, φ) are matrices one obtains after solving a DSGE model with
standard solution techniques. The matrix G is a picking matrix that equates observable
and state variables.
We assess the performance of a particular policy φ by its effects on households’
unconditional expected utility, i.e. before any uncertainty has been resolved. In Model














1− β . (4.3)
This approximation decomposes households’ utility in two parts. The first part is
utility in the steady state, and the second part comprises welfare-reducing fluctuations
around the long-run equilibrium. We assume that the policymaker can credibly commit
to a policy rule φ: if a policymaker decides to follow a certain policy rule φ once and
forever, agents believe indeed that the policymaker will. Given a particular value θi, the
optimal steady state invariant policy φ?i (θi) maximizes (4.3) by minimizing short-run
fluctuations captured in L(θi, x̂). Since the specification of households’ preferences is
independent of policy choices, the policymaker can only indirectly influence households’
loss by shaping the dynamics of the endogenous variables x̂ as defined by (4.1).
4.2.2 Two approaches to model uncertainty
We now turn to the optimal conduct of policy if the policymaker faces uncertainty about
the economic environment. We consider two approaches to cope with this uncertainty.
Specifying a marginal prior distribution with a positive unique mode for each pa-
rameter, the first approach or the standard practice is to develop and estimate one
single model that nests all features and frictions and employ the model in determin-
ing optimal policy. This is based on the idea that by capturing many aspects of the
economy in one single model, policy prescriptions derived from this model should guard
4x̂t denotes the percentage deviation of the generic variable xt from a deterministic steady state x
chosen as approximation point.
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against the risks of an uncertain economic environment. The only source of uncertainty
for the policymaker is uncertainty about the structural parameters of the model. We
refer to this approach as the complete-model approach.
The second approach starts with a stylized baseline model and treats each extension
by an additional feature or friction as a distinct and competing model. By averaging
across models, this approach allows to take not only parameter uncertainty but also
uncertainty about model specification into account. In the following we refer to this
approach as the model-averaging approach.
When pursuing the first approach to deal with model uncertainty, the relevant
uncertainty that a policymaker faces when she makes her decision about φ is given by
the joint posterior distribution in the model that nests all features and frictions. We
denote this ’complete’ model by Model c and its corresponding posterior distribution
of its structural parameters by f(θc) ≡ f(θ|Y,Mc), where Y is the set of time series
used in the estimation. The optimal policy (φ?c) is defined by:
φ?c = arg min
φ
EΘcL(Θc, x̂) (4.4)
s.t. x̂t = T (θc, φ)x̂t−1 +R(θc, φ)zt, ∀θc,
where EΘcL(Θc, x̂) is the expected loss when the structural parameters are a random
vector. Due to parameter uncertainty the policymaker has to average the loss over all
possible realizations of Θc to find the optimal vector of constant policy coefficients in
Model c, φ?c.
The second approach explicitly addresses specification uncertainty and averages
over different models. We separately estimate a discrete set of nested models M =
{M1, ...,Mc}, where M1 denotes the baseline model, Mc the complete model and
(c − 2) possible one-feature extensions of the baseline model. Employing the same
data and prior specification of shocks and common parameters, we calculate marginal
data densities p(Y |Mi) = E(f(Y |Θi)), where f(Y |Θi) denotes the data likelihood
and the expectation is taken with respect to the prior distribution of the structural
parameters. Since all models are nested in Model c, the marginal data density for
Model i satisfies:
p(Y |Mi) ≡ p(Y |θc6∈i = 0,Mc), (4.5)
where θc6∈i denotes the vector of structural parameters for Model c that are not con-
tained in the set of structural parameters of Model i = 1, 2, ...c. We employ the har-
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monic mean estimator to compute the data likelihood in a certain model as proposed
by Geweke (1999b) and more recently applied among others by An and Schorfheide
(2007). To compare the explanatory power of each model relative to the other models,
we compute posterior probabilities which are defined as
P (Mi|Y ) =
P (Mi)p(Y |Mi)∑c
j=1 P (Mj)p(Y |Mj)
, (4.6)
where P (Mi) denotes the prior probability for each model.5 To ensure that sub-models
are not discarded too easily and to facilitate competition between the nested models,
we assign positive and equal prior weights to each model. The posterior probability of
each model is then solely determined by its relative success to explain a given set of
time series, i.e. it takes a value close to zero when the predictive density of a model
relative to the others is neglectable.
In nested models, the second approach can also be thought of as defining a bimodal
prior distribution for the parameter that represents the additional feature or friction.
One part of the distribution is centered around the assumed positive modulus of the
parameter, and the other modulus is centered around zero. The idea of paying special
attention to this zero restriction and giving this possibility relatively more weight
reflects the natural scepticism every researcher and policymaker has when extending a
reasonable model.
Our approach however is more general than specifying bimodal prior distributions
because it can also be applied when models are not nested. In particular, it avoids a
discontinuity problem in the parameter space that arises when models are not nested.
To see this, suppose that the baseline model M1 is replaced by a very similar model
M∗1 that is not nested in the complete Model c. In other words, there is at least one
parameter that is not included in the prior specification of the complete model. In
this case, it seems to be reasonable to weight over all models, also includingM∗1. The
complete-model approach – even if it includes a bimodal prior specification – gives zero
weight to the parameter included in M∗1 but not in Model c. The model-averaging
approach weights over models independent whether they are nested or not, and thereby
avoids this discontinuity. In addition, the formulation of a bimodal prior distribution
in standard Bayesian model estimation is not straightforward and estimating a model
extension to zero might cause serious troubles when approximating the posterior mean.
5An alternative approach to compute posterior model probabilities in nested models involves cal-
culating Savage-Dickey density ratios as proposed by Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995).
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The optimal policy for the model-averaging approach (φ?a) is defined by
φ?a = arg min
φ
EM,ΘL(Θi, x̂) (4.7)
s.t. x̂t = T (θi, φ)x̂t−1 +R(θi, φ)zt, ∀θi, i = 1, ..., n.
The complete-model approach is a limiting case of model-averaging approach; they
are equivalent if the complete model exhibits a posterior probability of unity.
4.2.3 Assessing policy performance within and across models
We compare the performance of the two approaches by computing the average costs
of welfare relevant short-run fluctuations over all draws and models. This allows us to
assess the pitfalls of employing only one model that nests all features and frictions in
the policy analysis, i.e. focussing on parameter uncertainty in the complete model and
thereby ignoring the issue of specification uncertainty about nested models. Through-
out the chapter we express the resulting business cycle costs (BC) as the percentage
loss in certainty (steady state) equivalent consumption. First we compute the loss of







where the first term is steady state utility and x\c denotes the variables vector excluding
consumption. Since we want to express utility as reduction in certainty consumption
equivalents we set this expression to be equal to:
U
(
c(θ̃i)(1− BC), x\c(θ̃i), θ̃i
)
and solve for BC in percentage terms. Under parameter uncertainty this results in a
distribution for BC(θ̃i, φ̃) over Θi. Taking the expectation of this expression yields a
measure of the average losses in certainty consumption equivalents under a particular
policy φ̃.
As can be seen from (4.3), theoretical unconditional second moments derived from
the DSGE model are relevant for households’ utility losses due to short fluctuations
– and thus for the computation of business-cycle costs under different policies. As
Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008) point out, whether the theoretical unconditional
moments relevant for policy assessment and the ones observed in the data coincide de-
pends in particular on the specification of the prior distribution of standard deviations
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and autoregressive coefficients for the driving exogenous disturbances. We choose the
prior distribution for the standard deviations of the i.i.d. terms in zt and the autore-
gressive coefficients of the shocks contained in T (•) such that the relevant theoretical
unconditional second moments at the posterior mean in each model are in line the ones
computed directly from the stationary times series. This in turn yields welfare costs of
short run fluctuations consistent with the limit put forward by Lucas (2003).
4.3 Optimal monetary policy: the economic envi-
ronment
To demonstrate our main result, we create a set of monetary models including one
model that nests all features and frictions. Starting with a plain-vanilla cashless new
Keynesian economy as our baseline model (Woodford, 2003a), we subsequently in-
troduce two additional features (indexation and habit formation) and a transaction
friction (money in the utility function). While optimal policy in the baseline model
and in the models that feature indexation and habit formation seeks to stabilize fluc-
tuations in inflation and in the output gap, a transaction friction adds the stabilization
of the nominal interest rate as an additional and conflicting policy aim. In this section
we describe the models, derive the equations characterizing the equilibrium and the
relevant policy objectives as the unconditional expectation of households’ utility for
each model.
4.3.1 The baseline economy: Model 1
The baseline economy consists of a continuum of infinitely-lived households indexed
with j ∈ [0, 1] that have identical initial asset endowments and identical preferences.
Household j acts as a monopolistic supplier of labor services lj. Lower (upper) case let-
ters denote real (nominal) variables. At the beginning of period t, households’ financial
wealth comprises a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding
a (random) payment Zjt, and one-period nominally non-state contingent government
bonds Bjt−1 carried over from the previous period. Assume that financial markets are
complete, and let qt,t+1 denote the period t price of one unit of currency in a particular
state of period t + 1 normalized by the probability of occurrence of that state, condi-
tional on the information available in period t. Then, the price of a random payoff Zt+1
in period t+ 1 is given by Et[qt,t+1Zjt+1]. The budget constraint of the representative
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household reads




where ct denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption with elasticity of substitu-
tion ζ, Pt the aggregate price level, wjt the real wage rate for labor services ljt of type
j, Tt a lump-sum tax, Rt the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds, and Dit





βt{u(cjt)− v(ljt)}, β ∈ (0, 1), (4.9)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is as-
sumed to be non-decreasing in consumption, decreasing in labor time, strictly concave,
twice differentiable, and to fulfill the Inada conditions. Households are wage-setters
supplying differentiated types of labor lj, which are transformed into aggregate labor




jt dj. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between
different types of labor, εt > 1, varies exogenously over time. Cost minimization im-
plies that the demand for differentiated labor services ljt, is given by ljt = (wjt/wt)−εtlt,




jt dj. The transversality




iλjt+i(Bjt+i + Zjt+1+i)/Pjt+i = 0 (4.10)
. The final consumption good Yt is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced







it di, with ζ > 1. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by firm i and
the price index for the final good. The demand for each differentiated good is ydit =




it di. A firm i produces good yi using a technology that




jit dj]εt/(εt−1): yit = atlit, where lt =
∫ 1
0 litdi
and at is a productivity shock with mean 1. Labor demand satisfies: mcit = wt/at,
where mcit = mct denotes real marginal costs independent of the quantity that is
produced by the firm. We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of a staggered price
setting as developed by Calvo (1983). Each period firms may reset their prices with
probability 1 − α independently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. A
fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of firms are assumed to keep their previous period’s prices, Pit =
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αT−tqt,T (P̃ityiT (1− τ)− PTmcTyiT ), s.t. yiT = (P̃it)−ζP ζTyT , (4.11)
where τ denotes an exogenous sales tax. We assume that firms have access to
contingent claims.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
yt = atlt/∆t, (4.12)
where ∆t =
∫ 1
0 (Pit/Pt)−ζdi ≥ 1 and thus ∆t = (1 − α)(P̃t/Pt)−ζ + απ
ζ
t∆t−1. The
dispersion measure ∆t captures the welfare decreasing effects of staggered price setting.
Goods’ market clearing requires
ct + gt = yt. (4.13)
The central bank as the monetary authority is assumed to control the short-term
interest rate Rt with a simple feedback rule contingent on past interest rates, inflation
and output:
Rt = f(Rt−1, πt, yt). (4.14)
The consolidated government budget constraint reads: Rt−1Bt−1 + PtGt = Bt +
PtTt +
∫ 1
0 Pityitτdi. The exogenous government expenditures gt evolve around a mean
ḡ, which is restricted to be a constant fraction of output, ḡ = ȳ(1−sc). We assume that





We collect the exogenous disturbances in the vector ξt = [at, gt, µt], where µt = εtεt−1
is a wage mark-up shock. It is assumed that the percentage deviations of the first
two elements of the vector from their means evolve according to autonomous AR(1)-
processes with autocorrelation coefficients ρa, ρg ∈ [0, 1). The process for log(µt/µ̄)
and all innovations, zt = [εat , εg̃t , ε
µ
t ], are assumed to be i.i.d..
The recursive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3 Given initial values Pt0−1 > 0 and ∆t0−1 ≥ 1, a monetary policy and a
Ricardian fiscal policy Tt ∀ t ≥ t0, and a sales tax τ , a rational expectations equilibrium
(REE) for Rt ≥ 1, is a set of sequences {yt, ct, lt, mct, wt, ∆t, Pt, P̃it,Rt}∞t=t0 for
{ξt}∞t=t0
(i) that solve the firms’ problem (4.11) with P̃it = P̃t,
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(ii) that maximize households’ utility (4.9) s.t. their budget constraints (4.8),
(iii) that clear the goods market (4.13),
(iv) and that satisfy the aggregate resource constraint (4.12) and the transversality
condition (4.10).
In the next step, we seek to estimate the model by employing Bayesian methods. To
do so, we log-linearize the structural equations around the deterministic steady state
under zero inflation. Thus, the dynamics in the baseline economy are described by the
following two structural equations:
σ(Etŷt+1 − Etŷnt+1) = σ(ŷt − ŷnt ) + R̂t − Etπ̂t+1 − R̂nt (4.15)
π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 + κ(ŷt − ŷnt ), (4.16)
where σ = −uccc/(ucsc), ω = vlll/vl and κ = (1− α)(1− αβ)(ω + σ)/α. Furthermore,
k̂t denotes the percentage deviation of a generic variable kt from its steady-state value
k. The natural rates of output and interest, i.e the values for output and real interest
under flexible prices, are given by the following expressions
ŷnt =
(1 + ω)ât + σg̃t − µ̂t
ω + σ , R̂
n
t = σ[(g̃t − ŷnt )− Et(g̃t+1 − ŷnt+1)],
where g̃t = (gt − g)/y. The model is closed by a simple interest rate feedback rule as
an approximation to (4.14):
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + φππ̂t + φyŷt. (4.17)
The general system (4.1) in the baseline model then is the fundamental locally stable
and unique solution that satisfies (4.15)-(4.17) for a certain vector of constant policy
coefficients φ = (ρR, φπ, φy).
Our welfare measure is the unconditional expectation of representative households’
utility. Building on Woodford (2003a), after averaging over all households, a second-




2κ {var(π̂t) + λdvar(ŷt − ŷ
e
t )}, (4.18)
6Throughout we assume that the steady state is rendered efficient by an appropriate setting of the
sales tax rate.
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where λd = κ/ζ and the efficient rate of output is given by
ŷet = ŷnt + µ̂t/(ω + σ).
In the next subsection we consider habit formation and indexation to past inflation as
examples of missing lags in consumption and inflation.
4.3.2 Habit formation (Model 2) and indexation (Model 3)
One example of a missing lag in an endogenous variable is to allow for an internal habit
(e.g. Boivin and Giannoni (2006); Woodford (2003a)) in households’ total consump-
tion. The constituting equations for (4.1) are the policy rule (4.17) and the modified
versions of the Euler equation and the New Keynesian Philips curve:
ϕ[dt − ηdt−1]− ϕβηEt[dt+1 − ηdt] = Etπ̂t+1 + R̂nt − R̂t...
+ Etϕ[dt+1 − ηdt]− ϕβηEt[dt+2 − ηdt+1] (4.19)
π̂t = κh[(dt − δ∗dt−1)− βδ∗Et(dt+1 − δ∗dt)] + βEtπ̂t+1, (4.20)
where dt = ŷt − ŷnt , κh = ηϕκ[δ∗(ω + σ)]−1, ϕ = σ/(1 − ηβ), and the natural rate of
output follows7
[ω + ϕ(1 + βη2)]ŷnt − ϕηŷnt−1 − ϕηβEtŷnt+1 = ϕ(1 + βη2)g̃t − ϕηg̃t−1 − ϕηβEtgt+1...
+ (1 + ω)ât − µ̂t.




{var(π̂t) + λd,hvar(ŷt − ŷet − δ∗(ŷt−1 − ŷet−1))}, (4.21)
where λd,h = κh/ζ and the efficient rate of output is characterized by
[ω + ϕ(1 + βη2)]ŷet − ϕηŷet−1 − ϕηβEtŷet+1 = ϕ(1 + βη2)g̃t − ϕηg̃t−1 − ϕηβEtgt+1...
+ (1 + ω)ât.
7The parameter δ∗, 0 ≤ δ∗ ≤ η, is the smaller root of the quadratic equation ηϕ(1 + βδ2) =
[ω + ϕ(1 + βη2)]δ. This root is assigned to past values of the natural and efficient rate of output in
their stationary solutions.
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Like habit formation, the indexation of prices to past inflation induces the economy
to evolve in a history-dependent way. We assume that the fraction of prices that are
not reconsidered, α, adjusts according to logPit = logPit−1 + γ log πt−1 with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
as the degree of indexation. This implies that price dispersion evolves according to
∆t = (1− α)( P̃tPt )
−ζ + απ−ζγt−1 ∆t−1πζt . Correspondingly, the economy with indexation is
characterized by a modified aggregate supply curve
π̂t − γπ̂t−1 = βEt(π̂t+1 − γπ̂t) + κ(ŷt − ŷnt ), (4.22)




2κ {var(π̂t − γπ̂t−1) + λdvar(ŷt − ŷ
e
t )}, (4.23)
where λd and the efficient rate of output are defined as in the baseline economy.
4.3.3 Money in the utility function (Model 4)
We introduce a transaction friction by letting real money balances enter households’
utility in a separable way. More precisely, households’ utility of holding real money
balances is augmented by the amount z(mt) and a demand equation for real money
balances enters the set of equilibrium conditions. In log-linearized form this additional








where σm = −zmmm/zm and λ̂t denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget
constraint of the household. The stabilization loss in Model 4 is given by:
L(θ4, x̂) =
ucyζ(ω + σ)
2κ {var(π̂t) + λdvar(ŷt − ŷ
e
t ) + λ1Rvar(R̂t)}, (4.25)
where λd = κ/ζ, λ1R = λdβ[v(ω + σ)(1 − β)σm]−1 and v = y/m. The general form
(4.1) has to satisfy the (4.15)-(4.17) and (4.24).
4.3.4 The complete model
The complete model (Model c) builds on the baseline model and comprises habit
formation, indexation and money in the utility function. The equilibrium conditions
80 CHAPTER 4
in this case are: (4.19), (4.17), (4.24) and
π̂t − γπ̂t−1 = βEt(π̂t+1 − γπ̂t) + κh[(dt − δ∗dt−1)− βδ∗Et(dt+1 − δ∗dt)]. (4.26)
In the following proposition we state the loss function for Model c.
Proposition 1 If the fluctuations in yt around y, Rt around R, ξt around ξ, πt around
π are small enough, (R − 1)/R is small enough, and if the steady state distortions
φ vanish due to the existence of an appropriate subsidy τ , the utility of the average




βt−t0L(θc, x̂) + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t, (R− 1)/R‖3), (4.27)





{var(π̂t − γπ̂t−1) + λd,hvar(ŷt − ŷet − δ∗(ŷt−1 − ŷet−1)) + λ2Rvar(R̂t)},





and v = y/m > 0.
Proof: see appendix C.1.
4.4 Results
In this section we first present and interpret the estimation results. These results will
be key for the assessment of the relevant model uncertainty faced by the policymaker.
In the second part we compute optimal simple rules along with the procedures laid out
in section 4.2. As a standard, we determine optimal monetary policy at the posterior
mean, i.e. optimal policy in the absence of any model uncertainty. Then we analyze
optimal policy when there is uncertainty about the appropriate choice of nested models.
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4.4.1 Data and estimation results
We treat the variables real wage, output and consumer price inflation as observable.
The data consists of HP filtered quarterly values of these variables for the EU 13
countries from 1970-2006.8
We calibrate the discount factor to β = 0.99, the steady-state fraction of private
consumption relative to GDP c/y = 0.8 and the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated goods to ζ = 6 (see Woodford, 2003a). The specification of the prior
distributions of the estimated deep parameters closely follows Negro and Schorfheide
(2009), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007).9 While we assume
the disturbances g̃t and ât to follow stationary AR(1) processes, µ̂t is supposed to be
i.i.d.. Since we are interested in evaluating the explanatory power of each extension of
the baseline model separately, common parameters in the set of models need to exhibit
the same sufficient prior statistics. In particular, the marginal prior distributions for
the set of coefficients that describe the shock processes, ψg̃, ψa and σg̃, σa, σµ, do not
change across models, and they are specified according to the procedure explained in
Section 4.2.3.
We approximate the joint posterior distribution of structural parameters by draw-
ing 100, 000 times employing a standard MCMC-algorithm as described in An and
Schorfheide (2007) and discard the first 80, 000 draws. The estimation results are dis-
played in Table C.2 and the posterior and prior distributions are plotted in Figure 1-5
in Appendix C.2. The estimates of the posterior mean of the degree of relative risk
aversion with respect to consumption (σc), the degree of indexation (γ), and the de-
gree of price stickiness (α) correspond almost one-for-one to the findings by Smets and
Wouters (2003). In line with Woodford (2003a) we find the labor supply decision with
respect to changes in the real wage (1/ω) to be elastic, i.e. values for ω vary between
0.3 and 0.4. Our estimate of the internal habit parameter (η) is comparable to Negro
and Schorfheide (2009). Real money balances contribute only separately to households’
utility in Model 4 and Model c and do not influence the equilibrium dynamics of out-
put, inflation and the real wage. The parameter of relative risk aversion with respect
to real money balances (σm) cannot be identified and thus the prior distribution and
the posterior distribution are alike (see Figures 4 and 5).
In order to assess the explanatory power of each model, we compute marginal
likelihoods and the corresponding posterior probabilities. The results are presented in
8The dataset we use was kindly provided by the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (EABCN).
For a description of how this data is constructed see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001).
9See Appendix C.2 Table C.1 for a detailed description.
82 CHAPTER 4
Table 4.1. Here the key result is, that adding frictions and features to the baseline
model does not necessarily increase the posterior probability. First, enriching the
baseline model with a demand for cash does not increase the marginal likelihood for
Model 4: real money balances do not help to predict the observable variables. Second,
although the posterior distribution of the habit parameter (η) in Model 2 indicates a
positive posterior mean of this parameter, a habit in consumption does not improve the
fit to the data. This points to a well-known problem in Bayesian model estimation: The
informative prior on the habit parameter introduces curvature into the posterior density
surface (as pointed out by Poirier (1998) and An and Schorfheide (2007)). Third,
history dependence in inflation improves the fit of the model. With approximately
81% Model 3 exhibits the highest posterior probability. Thus, the complete model
incorporates features that helps to predict the data (indexation) and others that do
not (habit and money). It therefore exhibits a marginal likelihood higher than Model
1 but lower than Model 3.
Table 4.1: Posterior probabilities and marginal data densities
M1 M2 M3 M4 Mc
p(Y |Mi) 1683.98 1682.69 1696.83 1683.57 1695.39
P (Mi|Y ) 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.19
The welfare-assessment of optimal and sub-optimal policies in and across models
depends on the magnitude of the resulting stabilization losses, i.e. the welfare relevant
unconditional variances or standard deviations. In our context, these are the uncon-
ditional fluctuations in inflation and consumption (expressed in terms of a welfare-
relevant output gap) for the models without a transaction friction (see e.g. (4.18)),
and additionally fluctuations in interest rates, when money enters the utility function
(see e.g (4.28)). As can be verified in Table 4.2, our estimated theoretical moments at
the posterior mean are consistent with the corresponding ones directly estimated from
the stationary times series.
Table 4.2: Welfare-relevant standard deviations: models vs. data
M1 M2 M3 M4 Mc Data
std(c, θ̄i) 0.0070 0.0090 0.0068 0.0070 0.0078 0.0073
std(π, θ̄i) 0.0020 0.0020 0.0023 0.0020 0.0022 0.0020
std(R, θ̄i) 0.0028 0.0027 0.0031 0.0028 0.0031 0.0028
In the next section we begin the analysis of optimal policies in and across models.
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4.4.2 Optimal policy at the posterior mean
To establish a standard and to explain the stabilization trade-off, we determine the
optimal policy φ?i = (ρ?R, φ?π, φ?y)i at the posterior mean θ̄i for each Model i, i = 1, 2, ..,c.
To ease the numerical computation and to exclude unreasonably high policy responses,
we assume the following bounds for the policy coefficients of the simple interest rate
rule:
ρR ∈ [0, 20], ρπ ∈ [0, 20], and ρy ∈ [0, 20].
The optimal coefficients and the resulting business cycles costs (BC) expressed as equiv-
alent reductions in steady-state consumption are displayed in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Optimal policy at the posterior mean (φ?i )
R̂t = ρRR̂t−1 + φππ̂t + φyŷt
M1 M2 M3 M4 Mc
ρR 0.81 1.05 0.62 1.26 1.36
φπ 20.00 20.00 20.00 2.42 1.01
φy 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
BC(θ̄i, φ?i ) 0.0014% 0.0014% 0.0020% 0.0194% 0.0178%
Optimal policies are characterized by drawing on past interest rates. Put differently,
optimal policy is history-dependent (Woodford, 2003a,b). In the first three models
inflation stabilization is the predominant aim. Correspondingly, optimal policies fea-
ture a strong reaction on inflation.10 In Models 4 and c, households value real money
balances as a medium for transactions. This introduces stabilization of the nominal
interest rate as a conflicting aim to price stability (see (4.25) and (4.27)) in the presence
of fluctuations in the natural rate of interest. For intuition on this, suppose that φy
is small and that the economy in Model 1 is hit by a wage-markup shock. To fight
inflationary tendencies the output gap must decrease according to the aggregate supply
curve (4.16). This in turn requires a strong increase in the nominal interest rate to
fulfil the Euler equation (4.15), since the cost-push shock affects the natural rate of
interest. Therefore, optimal policies in models with a demand for cash exhibit a higher
coefficient ρR to smooth interest rates and a less aggressive response to inflation.
10The optimal policy response on inflation in these models always corresponds to its upper bound.
However, the welfare comparison between the two approaches to model uncertainty is independent of
the particular choice of the upper bound on the inflation response.
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Welfare costs in models that feature a transaction friction are substantially higher.
This increase is due to two effects. First, the stabilization of the interest rate adds
a new component to the welfare-relevant stabilization loss, which accounts for over
fifty percent of the increase in business cycle costs in Model 4 relative to Model 1. The
second effect relates to the conflict of stabilizing interest rates, inflation and the output
gap simultaneously, as apparent in the muted response to inflation in the optimal rules
for Models 4 and c. The resulting increase in the unconditional weighted variances of
inflation and the output gap accounts for the remaining increase in the costs of business
cycle fluctuations.
Table 4.4: The weights λd and λR at the posterior mean
Weights M1 M2 M3 M4 Mc
λd 0.0063 0.0231 0.0079 0.0057 0.0328
λR - - - 0.0602 0.0728
Table 4.4 shows how the importance of stabilization aims relative to inflation for house-
holds changes across models. For example, the stabilization of the output gap is five
times more important in Model c than in Model 1. In addition, the exact gap that pol-
icy should stabilize to maximize welfare differs (see (4.18) and (4.27)). Furthermore,
comparing the two models that feature a demand for cash reveals that the optimal
response to changes in inflation is larger in Model 4 than in Model c. Although both
specifications incorporate stabilizing the nominal interest rate as a policy aim, this aim
is relatively more important in Model c than in Model 4.
4.4.3 Evaluating two approaches to model uncertainty
In this section we quantitatively compare the two approaches to model uncertainty,
the complete-model and the model-averaging approach. We start by determining the
set of policy coefficients for the former approach according to (4.4), which yields
φ?c : ρR = 1.34; φπ = 1.17; φy = 0.00.
However, Model c is not the likeliest model since it also contains features which do
not help to explain the given time series of GDP, inflation and the real wage (see
Table 4.1). A policymaker pursuing a model-averaging approach to model uncertainty
weights welfare losses in a particular model with its posterior probability, i.e. derives
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an optimal policy over all draws and models according to (4.7):
φ?a : ρR = 1.39; φπ = 3.36; φy = 0.00.
Comparing the characteristics of the two rules reveals two similarities and one differ-
ence. Both rules draw heavily on past interest rates to avoid welfare-reducing fluc-
tuations in the interest rate in Models 4 and c, and put no emphasize on stabilizing
the output gap. The main difference between both rules is the preference to stabilize
inflation. While there is a conflict in stabilizing inflation and the nominal interest rate
jointly in Model c, this trade-off is absent in the likeliest model, Model 3.
To evaluate the performance of the two approaches as a guard against model un-
certainty we compute the business cycle cost for both policy rules in each Model i, i.e.
BC(Θi, φ?c) and BC(Θi, φ?a) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,c.
Table 4.5: Relative performance of φ?c and φ?a
M1 M2 M3 M4 Mc WA
BC(Θi, φ?c)/BC(Θi, φ?a) 2.22 2.16 1.90 1.26 0.74 1.68
WA denotes the posterior-model probability average of business cycle costs.
As can be seen from Table 4.5, the optimal rule φ?a performs twice as good as
φ?c in Models 1, 2 and 3 where inflation stabilization is the predominant principle.
Nevertheless, by reacting less harshly to inflation than the optimal rules from those
models (see Table 4.3), it avoids high welfare losses in Model c. On average, optimal
policy derived from the model-averaging approach leads to welfare gains of 68% relative
to the optimal policy rule derived by the complete-model approach.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analyzed how to optimally conduct policy from a Bayesian per-
spective when the policymaker faces uncertainty about the appropriate choice among
nested models. In particular, we have compared two approaches to model uncertainty.
The complete-model approach is set to represent the standard practice: without paying
special attention to the set of sub-models, the policymaker determines optimal policy by
maximizing households’ utility within one single model that nests all features and fric-
tions. The model-averaging approach takes uncertainty about the appropriate choice of
nested models into account and weights over the set of nested models to derive optimal
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policy prescriptions. Using EU-13 data, we find that the model-averaging approach
leads to welfare gains of approximately 70 percent compared to the standard practice.
Appendix A
Technical Appendix to chapter 2
A.1 Derivation of the posterior distribution of the
BVAR
A.1.1 Prior distribution
vec(B)|Σ ∼ N (vec(B0),Σ⊗N−10 ) (A.1)
Σ ∼ IW(v0S0, v0) (A.2)
Σ is of size m×m, N0 of size k× k, where k = m ∗ l. The probability density function
(p.d.f.) of vec(B) is given by:














Σ−1 (B −B0)′N0 (B −B0)
]
}.
The p.d.f. of Σ is defined as:





























vec(u) ∼ N (0,Σ⊗ I), (A.3)





The kernel can be rewritten as:
(Y −XB)′(Y −XB) = (Y −XB −XB̂ +XB̂)′(Y −XB −XB̂ +XB̂) (A.5)
(Y −XB̂)′(Y −XB̂) + (B − B̂)′X ′X(B − B̂).
A.1.3 Posterior























Σ−1(B − B̂)′X ′X(B − B̂)
]
}
Use the formula as stated in Leamer (1978)1:
(B − B̂)′X ′X(B − B̂) (B −B0)′N0 (B −B0) = (B −BT )′NT (B −BT ) (A.7)
× (B −B0)′(X ′X(NT )−1N0)(B −B0),
where:
NT = N0 +X ′X
BT = N−1T (N0B0 +X ′XB̂)
1Appendix 1, T10
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leads to:






















Σ−1(B −BT )′NT (B −BT )
]
}












(B −B0)′(X ′X(NT )−1N0)(B −B0)))]
× (2π)−m(T+k)/2|Σ|−(T+k)/2exp{−12tr
[
Σ−1(B −BT )′NT (B −BT )
]
}.
A.2 Description and solution of the FTPL model
A.2.1 FTPL Model Setup
UF,t = log(cF,t) + log(mF,t) (A.10)




























RF,t = αF0 + αFπF,t + θF,t (A.15)
θF,t = ρF1θF,t−1 + εF1,t (A.16)
εF1,t ∼ N(0, σF1) (A.17)
Fiscal authority:
τF,t = γF0 + γbF,t−1 + ψF,t (A.18)
ψF,t = ρF2ψF,t−1 + εF2,t (A.19)




RF,t = αF0 + αFπF,t + θF,t
πF,t+1 = βFαF0 + βFαFπF,t + βF θF,t























































































































b̃F,t + ϕF1π̃F,t + ϕF3θF,t − (β−1F − γF )b̃F,t−1 + ψF,t + ϕF4θF,t−1 + ϕF2π̃F,t−1 = 0 (A.21)
b̃F,t + ϕF1π̃F,t + ϕF3θF,t + ψF,t = (β−1F − γF )b̃F,t−1 − ϕF4θF,t−1 − ϕF2π̃F,t−1 (A.22)
A.2.4 Calibration
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A.3 Solution of the Deep habits model
A.3.1 Steady state
R?H = 1/βH (A.23)
h̄H = 0.3 (A.24)
x̄H = (1− θdH)h̄H (A.25)
c̄H = h̄H (A.26)
λ̄cH = 1/((1− θdH)ηH) (A.27)
λ̄yH = 1 + (θdHβH − 1)λ̄cH (A.28)
w̄H = λ̄yH (A.29)
λ̄hH = w̄H/(x̄σHφH) (A.30)




x̄H x̂H,t = c̄H ĉH,t − θdH c̄H ĉH,t−1 (A.32)
γH h̄
κH
H κH ĥH,t = x̄
−σH





H(λ̂hH,t + ĥH,t + σH x̂H,t) + ζHw(π̂Hw,t − ˆ̃πHw,t) (A.34)
= h̄Hw̄H(ĥH,t + ŵH,t) + βζHw(π̂Hw,t+1 − ˆ̃πHw,t+1)
− σH x̂H,t = R?HR̂H,t − σx̂H,t+1 − π̂H,t+1 (A.35)
ĉH,t = ĥH,t (A.36)
λ̂yH,t = ŵH,t (A.37)




H,t + λ̄cH λ̂cH,t = θdHβH λ̄cH(−σH x̂H,t+1 + σH x̂H,t + λ̂cH,t+1) (A.39)
ηH λ̄
c
H x̄H(λ̂cH,t + x̂H,t) + ζHp(π̂H,t − ˆ̃πH,t) = c̄H ĉH,t + βHζHp(π̂H,t+1 − ˆ̃πH,t+1) (A.40)
R̂H,t = ρHrR̂H,t−1 + (1− ρHr)(αHππ̂H,t + αHyŷH,t) + εH,t (A.41)
ˆ̃πH,t = (1− νHp)π̂H,t−1 (A.42)
ˆ̃πHw,t = (1− νHw)π̂Hw,t−1 (A.43)
w̄HŵH,t = w̄HŵH,t−1 + π̂Hw,t − π̂H,t (A.44)
A.3.3 Calibration and estimation of the deep habits model









Appendix Matching Theory and Data 95
A.4 Data description
The frequency of all data used is quarterly. The data ranges from 1955.1 to 2009.1.
All series except the Fed Funds rate are in logs. GDP, personal consumption and real
wages are transformed into per capita.
Nominal GDP: This series is BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product.
Private Consumption: This series is BEA NIPA Table 1.1.5. Personal consumption
expenditures.
Wage: The wage rate is the series COMPNFB (Nonfarm Business Sector: Compen-
sation Per Hour) at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website.
Interest Rate: This is the Federal Funds rate taken from Fred2.
Adjusted reserves: This is the adjusted monetary base given by the series adjressl
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ADJRESSL.
PPIC: This series is http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PPICRM.
Real GDP: This series is BEA NIPA Table 1.1.6. Real Gross Domestic Product.
Implicit GDP Deflator: The implicit GDP deflator is calculated as the ratio of
Nominal GDP to Real GDP
Civilian Population: This is a quarterly measure for the population given by the
respective average of the monthly values of the series CNP16OV, Civilian Non-
institutional Population at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
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A.5 Figures
Figure A.1: Prior distribution FTPL model
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Real debt  
Figure A.2: Prior Bayesian IRF for a fiscal policy shock regime I in the FTPL model
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Real debt  
Figure A.3: Prior Bayesian IRF for a monetary policy shock regime I in the FTPL
model
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Real debt  
Figure A.4: Prior Bayesian IRF for a fiscal policy shock regime II in the FTPL model
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3 Real debt  
Figure A.5: Prior Bayesian IRF for a monetary policy shock regime II in the FTPL
model
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Figure A.6: Posterior distribution FTPL model
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Figure A.7: Estimated Bayesian IRF for a fiscal policy shock in the FTPL model: VAR
model (black line) vs. DSGE model (dashed line).
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Figure A.8: Estimated Bayesian IRF for a monetary policy shock in the FTPL model:
VAR model (black line) vs. DSGE model (dashed line).
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Figure A.9: Impulse response function of the deep habits model drawing from the prior
distribution of deep parameters (100 % probability bands).
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Figure A.10: Impulse response functions of the deep habits model (dashed line) versus
VAR model with simulated data (68 % probability bands).
Appendix Matching Theory and Data 107



























































Figure A.11: Prior distribution (white) vs. Posterior distribution (black). Monte-Carlo
experiment deep habits model.
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Figure A.12: Posterior distribution of impulse response functions of the deep habits
model (dashed line) versus VAR model (solid line) (68 % probability bands).
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Technical Appendix to chapter 3
B.1 Data description
The frequency of all data used is quarterly.
Real GDP: This series is BEA NIPA table 1.1.6 line 1 (A191RX1).
Nominal GDP: This is a measure for the nominal GDP given by the series GDP,
Gross Domestic Product at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. It is measured in billions of dollars.
Implicit GDP Deflator: The implicit GDP deflator is calculated as the ratio of
Nominal GDP to Real GDP.
Private Consumption: Nominal consumption expenditures for non-durables and
services is the sum of the respective values of the series PCND, Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures: Nondurable Goods and PCESV, Personal Consumption
Expenditures: Services at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. Both series are measured in billions of dol-
lars.
Private Investment: Total real private investment is the sum of the respective values
of the series BEA NIPA table 1.1.6 line 6 (A006RX1) and PCDG, Personal Con-
sumption Expenditures: Durable Goods at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’
website http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ (billions of dollars) in real terms.
Government Expenditure: Current government expenditure is the series in BEA
NIPA table 3.1 line 15 (W022RC1).
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Government Debt: The annual government debt is the historical series that can be
copied from TreasuryDirect at
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/histdebt/histdebt.htm. The quar-
terly data is generated by a linear interpolation. The values have been converted
from dollars to billions of dollars. Note that the beginning of the fiscal year
changed from July 1 to October 1 in 1977.
Hours worked: This series is downloadable from the website of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate. The series’ identification number
is: PRS84006033. It is an index (1992=100).
Wage: The wage rate is the series COMPNFB, Nonfarm Business Sector: Compen-
sation Per Hour at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/.
Government Consumption Expenditures: Government consumption
expenditures is the series BEA NIPA table 3.1 line 16 (A955RC1).
Civilian Population: This is a quarterly measure for the population given by the
respective average of the monthly values of the series CNP16OV, Civilian Non-
institutional Population at the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis’ website
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. The numbers have been converted from
thousands to billions.
B.2 Estimation of the VMA model
B.2.1 Notation of the VMA model
Let Yt be a m× 1 vector at date t = 1 + l, . . . , T , ϕVi coefficient matrices of size m×m
and ε an i.i.d. one-step ahead forecast error, distributed: ε ∼ N (0, Im×m). The VMA





where ϕVi denotes a moving average coefficient matrix. The impulse response function
of a VMA model to an innovation in variable j at horizon i ϕVij is given by the j-th
column of the i-th coefficient matrix.
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Due to the assumption that Σε = Im×m this structural moving average representa-
tion cannot be estimated directly. Instead the reduced form moving average represen-
tation with error term ut = Aεt, where u ∼ N (0,Σ), is estimated. The reduced form





The factorization Σ = A′A does not have a unique solution, which leads to an identi-
fication problem of A.
The impulse matrix Ă is defined as a sub matrix of A of size m× n where n is the
number of structural shocks under consideration, i.e. the structural shock of interest
as well as other shocks necessary to distinguish this shock. These shocks have to be
included into the DSGE model as well. In order to indicate that the restrictions put
on A rely on the model and therefore its parameter vector θ, I write Ă(θ). Given a
number of rowvectors qj forming an orthonormal matrix Q and the lower Cholesky
decomposition of Σ, Ã, Ă(θ) is defined as: Ă(θ) = ÃQ(θ).
B.2.2 The conditional distribution of VMA model parameters
The posterior distribution is evaluated in the following way: Denote the likelihood
estimates as vec(Φ̃) and vec(Σ̃)1. vec(Φ) and vec(Σ) are normally distributed with
[vec(Σ)′vec(Φ)′]′ ∼ N ([vec(Σ̃)′vec(Φ̃)′]′,Σl) (B.3)
where Σl is the inverse of the Hessian computed at [vec(Σ̃)′vec(Φ̃)]′. Every realization
of the vector of parameters of the DSGE model θ is associated with an impulse response
function of the DSGE model and a realization of the impulse matrix Ă(θ).
A sequence of realizations of θ yields a sequence of restrictions and therefore a re-
lated prior probability distribution. Given a realization of an impulse response function
of the DSGE model ϕD the posterior distribution is evaluated the following way:
1. Derive the sign restrictions from ϕD.
2. Draw a realization of Φ and Σ from the distribution (B.3).
3. Calculate Ã and draw Q(θ) from a uniform distribution such that Ă(θ) = ÃQ(θ)
fulfills the sign restriction.
1vec(Σ) summarizes only the unique entries in Σ.
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4. Given A compute the structural impulse responses from ϕi = ΦiA, i = 1 · · · k.
B.2.3 Sampling algorithm
In order to evaluate the joint posterior distribution of the parameters of the DSGE
model and the VAR model I use a Gibbs sampling algorithm combined with a
Metropolis-Hastings step. The Gibbs sampling algorithm allows to draw from from the
conditional distribution of the VMAmodel given restrictions from the DSGE model and
from the conditional distribution of the DSGE model given impulse response functions
from the VMAmodel. The Metropolis-Hastings step is a acceptance/rejection sampling
algorithm that determines the probability space where the implied impulse response
functions of the DSGE model and those of the VAR model coincide. It is carried out
20 times.
To initialize the algorithm candidate distributions for the conditional distributions
p(ϕV |θ, Y ) and p(θ|ϕV ) are derived: for jS = 1 . . . dS
1. Draw a θjS from p(θ).
2. For every realization of the vector of deep parameters of the DSGE model derive
the corresponding sign restriction.
3. Draw a ΦjS from vec(Φ) ∼ N (vec(Φ̃), Σ̃Φ) and an orthonormal matrix QjS so




4. For every realization of ϕVjS derived from step 3 find the θjS that maximizes (2.49)
combined with the prior p(θ).
5. Repeat this d times.
The dS vectors of deep structural parameters define the candidate distribution
p(θ|ϕV )c and a corresponding distribution of p(ϕV |θ)c for the following algorithm. At
each iteration iS = 1, . . . , IS conduct the following steps:
1. Draw nS times from p(θ|ϕV )c.
2. For every realization of the vector of deep parameters of the DSGE model derive
the corresponding sign restrictions.
3. For every derived sign restrictions draw a Φ from vec(Φ) ∼ N (vec(Φ̃), Σ̃Φ). Com-
pute the lower Cholesky decomposition and find an Ă = ÃQ fulfilling the sign
restrictions 2. Compute the corresponding ϕV , yielding p(ϕV |θ)ĩS .
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4. For every realization of ϕV derived from step 3 find the θ that maximizes (2.49)
combined with the prior p(θ). This yields p(θ|ϕV )ĩS .
5. Do acceptance-rejection by comparing p(θ|ϕV )ĩS with p(θ|ϕV )iS−1. Keep the
corresponding vectors from p(ϕV |θ)ĩS . This yields p(θ|ϕV )iS−1 and p(ϕV |θ)iS .
6. Start again at 1.
The chain converges if p(θ|ϕV )iS and p(θ|ϕV )iS−1 as well as p(ϕV |θ)iS and p(ϕV |θ)iS−1
are similar, i.e. the acceptance rate is low. It is important to note that the candidate
p(θ|ϕV )c is not adjusting over the algorithm in order to avoid that the algorithm is
stuck and to allow for a continuous wide range of the parameters of the DSGE model.
Thus, dS should be chosen high enough. I have dS = 200 chosen.
B.3 Kalman Filter and root-flipping
This section provides insights how the Kalman Filter flips the roots of a non-stable
process similar to a Blaschke factor and therefore recovers the correct econometric
estimates. The calculations and the example in this section are mostly taken from
slides by Eric Leeper2.
To keep this section self-explanatory, I first set out briefly the DSGE model used as
an example. The DSGE model, as in Leeper et al. (2008), is a standard growth model
with log preferences, inelastic labor supply, and complete depreciation of capital. The








cg,t + kg,t = vg,t
vg,t = ag,tkαgg,t−1
where βg is the discount factor, αg the share of capital in the production function, ag
an exogenous technology shock. The government sets taxes according to:
tg,t = τg,tvg,t
After log linearizing the system of equations, the equilibrium is characterized by a
2From ZEI summer school 2008.
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second-order difference equation in capital, which is solved by:







where θg = αgβg(1− τ̄g). In a DSGE model with pre-announced taxes the tax rate τ̂t
is a function of news shocks εg,τ,t−q, where q denotes the pre-announcement horizon.





For q = 2 (B.4) can be written as:
k̂g,t = αgk̂g,t−1 + âg,t − κg (εg,τ,t−1 + θεg,τ,t) (B.5)
Equation (B.5) can be written as:
(1− αgL)k̂g,t = −κg(L+ θg)εg,τ,t.
Invertibility of this stochastic process requires |θg| > 1, which is not case. One way to
achieve invertibility is to employ a Blaschke factor 3 (L+ θg)/(1 + θgL). Define a new
error term ε?g,τ,t = (L+ θg)/(1 + θgL)εg,τ,t. Then:
(1− αgL)k̂g,t = −κ(L+ θg)
(1 + θgL)
(L+ θg)
(L+ θg)/(1 + θgL)εg,τ,t
(1− αgL)k̂g,t = −κ(1 + θgL)ε?g,τ,t








Equation (B.6) is now an invertible stochastic process for |θg| < 1.
Another way to achieve invertibility is to write equation (B.5) as state space system
in the innovation representation:
xg,t+1 = Agxg,t +Kgag,t
yg,t = Cgxg,t + ag,t
with xg,t = −(κgθg)−1k̂g,t − εg,τ,t, yg,t = −(κgθg)−1k̂g,t, ag,t = εg,τ,t−1, Ag = αg, Cg = 1
and Kg = (αg + θ−1g ). The condition for invertibility of the system is found by using
3See Lippi and Reichlin (1993), Lippi and Reichlin (1994) and Mertens and Ravn (2009) for further
information.
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ag,t = yg,t − Cgxg,t and rewriting the state space system as:
xg,t+1 = (Ag − CgKg)xg,t +Kgyg,t
ag,t = yg,t − Cgxg,t
The system is stable if the eigenvalues of (Ag −CgKg) are inside the unit circle. Since
Ag − CgKg = αg − αg − θ−1g = −θ−1g and θ−1g > 1, the system is not stable. But, it
can be shown that there exists a Kg so that the system is stable. This involves the
following assumptions concerning time invariance of the Kalman Filter:
1. The pair (A′g, C ′g) is stabilizable. A pair (A′g, C ′g) is stabilizable if y′gCg = 0 and
y′gAg = λgy′g for some complex number λg and some complex vector yg implies
that |λg| < 1 or yg = 0.
2. The pair (Ag, Gg) is detectable. The pair (Ag, Gg) is detectable if G′gyg = 0 and
Agyg = λgyg for some complex number λg and some complex vector yg implies
that |λg| < 1 or yg = 0.
Both assumptions are fulfilled for the process and the conditions yield αg = λg or y = 0.
The Riccati equation for the covariance matrix of the innovation ag,t can be solved for





which yields a corresponding Kalman gain:
Kg = αg + θg
The condition for stability reads now Ag −KgCg = −θg. Since |θg| < 1 the process is
now invertible.
B.4 Loglinearized Equations of the DSGE model
The loglinearized DSGE model consists of the following equations:
ĉot = ĉot+1 − R̂t + π̂t+1 (B.7)
q̂t = −ĉot+1 + ĉot + (1− β(1− δ))R̂kt+1 + βq̂t+1 (B.8)
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îot − k̂ot−1 = ηq̂t (B.9)









(φbb̂t−1 + φgĝt) (B.11)
ĉt + ϕn̂t = ŵt (B.12)
ĉt = λĉrt + (1− λ)ĉot (B.13)
k̂t = k̂ot (B.14)
ît = îot (B.15)











π̂t = βEt[π̂t+1]− λpm̂ct (B.18)
m̂ct = ŷt − n̂t − ŵt (B.19)




















R̂t = φππ̂t (B.22)
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ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + εg,t−3 (B.23)
B.5 Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Prior and posterior distribution of the structural parameters of the DSGE
model
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter distribution mean std mean std
ρg beta 0.8 0.1 0.74 0.02
φg gamma 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.01
φb gamma 0.33 0.1 0.74 0.02
λ beta 0.4 0.1 0.32 0.02
ϑ beta 0.7 0.15 0.73 0.03
η normal 7 5 4.2 0.81
ν gamma 0.2 0.1 0.14 0.01
σg invgamma 0.02 0.026 0.01 0.001
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Figure B.1: Government expenditure shock two periods preannounced DSGE model
calibrated to redo Ramey
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Figure B.2: Result Monte Carlo Experiment
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Figure B.3: Impulse response function from prior distribution of the DSGE model. All
impulse responses included (100 % probability bands)















































Real debt   
Figure B.4: Data (blue) vs. likelihood estimates VMA (green)
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Figure B.5: Impulse Responses after a pre-announced increase in government expen-
ditures. Pre-announcement three quarters. (68% probability bands)
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Figure B.6: Impulse Responses of the DSGE model (dashed) and the VMA model after
a pre-announced (three quarters) increase in government expenditures. 68% probability
bands
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Figure B.7: Prior (white) vs. Posterior (black) distribution of the DSGE model
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Figure B.8: Impulse responses of the nominal interest rate and inflation in the DSGE
model.
128 Appendix B











Figure B.9: Fiscal multiplier defined as fm=(response of gdp/change in government
consumption expenditures)/average share of government consumption expenditures in
gdp. 68% probability bands.
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Figure B.10: Fiscal multiplier defined as fm=(cumulative response of gdp/change in
government consumption expenditures)/average share of government consumption ex-
penditures in gdp. 68% probability bands.
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Figure B.11: Variance decomposition: Business cycle shock. 68% probability bands.
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Technical Appendix to chapter 4
C.1 Proof of proposition 1
The period utility function of the average household in equilibrium is given by:
∫ 1
0




To derive (4.27) we need to impose that, in the optimal steady state, real money
balances are sufficiently close to being satiated (see Woodford, 2003a, Assumption 6.1)
such that we can treat (R− 1)/R as an expansion parameter.
The first summand can be approximated to second order by:
u(yt − gt − η(yt−1 − gt−1)) = ucy(1− βη)[ŷt +
1
2(1− ϕ(1 + η
2β))ŷ2t + ϕηŷtŷt−1
+ ϕŷt(−ηgt−1 − βηgt+1 + (1 + η2β)gt)] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3), (C.1)
where we used (xt − x) = x(x̂t + 0.5x̂2t ) + O(‖x̂t‖3), ϕ = σ1−βη , t.i.s.p denotes terms
independent of stabilization policy, σ = −yu11/u1, and gt = (Gt −G)/y.
Since yt = atlt/∆t, the second term can be approximated by




t − (1 + ω)âtŷt + ∆̂t] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3), (C.2)
where we posited that in the equilibrium under flexible wages each household supplies
the same amount of labor, l = y, ω = vll
vl
l, and that due to the existence of an output
subsidy the steady state is rendered efficient with vl = uc(1− βη). In the next step we
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combine (C.1) and (C.2), employ g̃t = −ηgt−1 − βηEtgt+1 + (1 + η2β)gt, and obtain:
u(yt − gt − η(yt−1 − gt−1))−
∫ 1
0




+ ϕηŷtŷt−1 + ϕŷtg̃t + (1 + ω)âtŷt − ∆̂t] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3). (C.3)
The efficient rate of output is defined by the following difference equation:
[ω + ϕ(1 + βη2)]ŷet − ϕηŷet−1 − ϕηβEtŷet+1 = ϕg̃t + (1 + ω)ât + O(‖ξ̂t‖2).














−ϕηŷtŷt−1− [ω+ϕ(1+βη2)]ŷet ŷt+ϕηŷet−1ŷt+ϕηβEtŷet+1ŷt+∆̂t}+ t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3).
(C.4)
We seek to rewrite this expression in purely quadratic terms of the welfare-relevant gaps
for inflation and output. To do so we apply the method of undetermined coefficients
to reformulate the first part (all but ∆̂t), i.e. we seek to find the coefficient δ0, such
that (C.4) and
− 12δ0(ŷt − ŷ
e
t − δ∗(ŷt−1 − ŷet−1))2
= −12δ0
[ŷ2t − 2ŷtŷet + (ŷet )2 − 2δ∗(ŷt − ŷet )(ŷt−1 − ŷet−1) + (δ∗)2(ŷ2t−1 − 2ŷt−1ŷet−1 + (ŷet−1)2)]
= −12δ0[ŷ
2
t − 2ŷtŷet − 2δ∗ŷtŷt−1 + 2δ∗ŷtŷet−1 + 2δ∗ŷet ŷt−1 + (δ∗)2ŷ2t−1 − 2(δ∗)2ŷt−1ŷet−1]
= −12δ0[((δ
∗)2β + 1)ŷ2t − 2δ∗ŷtŷt−1 + 2δ∗ŷtŷet−1 + 2δ∗βŷet+1ŷt − (2(δ∗)2β + 2)ŷtŷet ]
= −12δ0((δ
∗)2β + 1)ŷ2t + δ0δ∗ŷtŷt−1 − δ0δ∗ŷtŷet−1 − δ0δ∗βŷet+1ŷt + δ0((δ∗)2β + 1)ŷtŷet
are consistent. We use that ŷt0−1 is t.i.s.p.. The parameter δ∗, 0 ≤ δ∗ ≤ η, is the
smaller root of this quadratic equation: ηϕ(1 + βδ2) = [ω + ϕ(1 + βη2)]δ. This root is
assigned to past values of the natural and efficient rate of output in their stationary
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(1− α)(1− αβ)(π̂t − γπ̂t−1)
2 + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3),









(ŷt − ŷet − δ∗(ŷt−1 − ŷet−1))2 +
ζα
(1− α)(1− αβ)(π̂t − γπ̂t−1)
2] + t.i.s.p.+O(‖ξ̂t‖3).
The last approximation needed is that involving the utility of real money balances.
Applying similar techniques we get




t ) + t.i.s.p+O(‖ξ̂t‖3), (C.5)
where we employ sm = zmm/(ucy) = (R−1)(1−βη)R and σm = −zmmm/zm. Since we
treat (R− 1)/R as an expansion parameter, sm and 1/σm are of first order. However,
















At the limit for (R−1)/R→ 0, it follows that ηi = −uc(1−βη)/(zmmm) and therefore
smσm = (1 − βη)/(vηi), with v = y/m. A first-order approximation of the money
demand equation (4.24) yields






λ̂t = −ϕ(ŷt − ηŷt−1) + βηϕ(ŷt+1 − ηŷt) + ϕ(gt − ηgt−1)− βηϕ(gt+1 − ηgt) +O(‖ξ̂t|2).








R̂t) + t.i.s.p+O(‖ξ̂t, (R− 1)/R‖3). (C.6)
We assume for simplicity that [(R− 1)/R− 0] is of second order, and sum the results
in expression (4.27) in the text.
C.2 Estimation Results
Table C.1: Prior distribution of the structural parameters
Prior distribution
Parameter distribution mean std
ρ beta 0.8 0.1
φπ normal 1.7 0.1
φy normal 0.125 0.05
ω gamma 1 0.5
σc normal 1.5 0.375
α beta 0.75 0.05
η beta 0.7 0.1
γ beta 0.75 0.15
σm normal 1.25 0.375
ψg beta 0.7 0.1
ψa beta 0.7 0.1
σg invgamma 0.04 0.026
σa invgamma 0.04 0.026
σµ invgamma 0.04 0.026
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Figure C.2: Deep parameters prior vs. posterior (black) distribution in Model 2
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Figure C.3: Deep parameters prior vs.posterior (black) distribution in Model 3































































































































Figure C.5: Deep parameters prior vs. posterior (black) distribution in Model 5
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